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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores how questions of Jewish victimhood at the Nazi concentration and death camp 
Majdanek were negotiated by Poles and Soviets during the immediate post-liberation period in 
Lublin from July to October, 1944.  After liberating eastern Poland, the Soviets established the 
Polish Committee for National Liberation (PKWN [Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego]), 
the local Polish governing body that would replace the pre-war Polish government-in-exile in 
London (Rząd Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie) and secure a transition to communist 
rule in Poland. The immediate post-liberation period in eastern Poland was a time of political flux 
during which it was unclear whether a smooth transition to communism would occur. The Soviets 
and Poles remained ambiguous on several issues, especially on questions concerning Polish-
Jewish relations. This study explores how a fluid and complicated immediate post-war political 
situation effected the erasure of Jewish suffering at Majdanek in the context of establishing 
communist rule in Catholic Poland, securing communist moral and political authority in the post-
war world order, and upholding Soviet internationalist values. Soviet internationalism is examined 
through the lenses of competing domestic interests in early post-war Poland, providing a 
perspective on the development of early Polish-Soviet relations. 
 The Polish-Soviet Extraordinary Commission to Investigate German Crimes at Majdanek 
existed simultaneously with and mirrored other political developments in PKWN Poland. That is, 
it reflected an institutionally domestic creation to serve Polish interests but was under Soviet 
influence and its de facto authority. The chapters of this thesis show 1) the political developments 
in Lublin during the first days of liberation 2) the proceedings of the Polish-Soviet Commission 
and 3) the debates among members of the Commission on how to address Jewish victimhood and 
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other ethnic specificity, as well as an analysis of such representation in the Communique published 
by the Commission in the Soviet and Polish presses on September 16, 1944.  
Ultimately, during this time of flux in the immediate period of liberation, Soviet 
Commission member Professor N. I. Grashchenkov, PKWN member and President of the 
Commission Andrzej Witos, and PKWN member of the Commission Dr. Emil Sommerstein 
represented the triangle of Soviet, Polish, and Jewish interests being carefully negotiated during 
this time, with the hierarchy of priorities in that order.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“On November 3, 1943, eighteen thousand four hundred persons were shot in the camp.” 
 Excerpt from the Communique of the Polish-Soviet Extraordinary  
Commission at Majdanek published in Pravda on September 16, 1944 
 
“I know that on November 3, 1943, shootings of Jews happened.” 
Excerpt from the Commission’s interrogation of the Polish political  
prisoner from August 24, 1944 
 
After the film Schindler’s List won Best Picture at the Academy Awards in 1944, an 
opinion piece appeared shortly thereafter in the New York Times in response to the anticipated 
“Holocaust boom” in America.  The boom happened. However, the author proceeded cautiously, 
understanding that monumental symbols sometimes help synthesize a popular conception of 
finality. In his words: “The art of remembering the Holocaust is by definition a work in progress. 
The moment that people start smugly pointing to long box-office lines and saying the job is done 
is the moment to worry that the world is beginning to forget.”1 The film’s release coincided with 
an increase in research on the history of the Holocaust while also helping crystallize pre-existing 
popular understandings of Holocaust imagery and geography. That is, most research continued 
under western historiographical traditions for writing about the Holocaust, i.e., seeking to 
understand why it happened and arguing for its uniqueness, while the historic and artistic canons 
continued to perpetuate the camp imagery of gas chambers and crematoria. Auschwitz, which at 
the time was in Germany’s pre-war borders, remains the popular geographical focus with Jews 
from more western European lands as the primary victims.  
Frank Rich’s 1994 piece on the “Holocaust boom” in its warning against perceiving 
Holocaust memory as completed so strikingly resembles – almost even seemingly anticipated – 
what was then published in 2009 in a New York Review of Books essay by Timothy Snyder in 
                                                          
1 Frank Rich, “The Holocaust Boom,” The New York Times, April 7, 1994.  
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which he stated: “Auschwitz, generally taken to be an adequate or even a final symbol of the evil 
of mass killing, is in fact only the beginning of knowledge, a hint of the true reckoning with the 
past still to come.”2 Snyder implored historians to do what, he argued, has not yet been done, 
calling for new studies to go “east of Auschwitz” to the areas on Soviet or Soviet-occupied territory 
where the Holocaust occurred, including several death camps in eastern Poland. One such death 
camp, Majdanek, is the subject of this thesis.  
However, it would be unfair and inaccurate to conclude that the Holocaust east of 
Auschwitz has thus far been “an ignored reality.” While public understanding of the Holocaust 
actually does fit quite well with Snyder’s assessment, several scholars have produced large bodies 
of scholarship on the Holocaust in these areas. While the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum has only recently begun to deeply expand research and exhibitions to include the 
Holocaust on Soviet territory, scholars such as Zvi Gitelman and Mordechai Altshuler have been 
writing on the Holocaust in the Soviet context since the 1980s and 1990s, and Gitelman was one 
of the earliest scholars who tried to combat misconceptions that the Soviets simply ignored it.3 
More recent scholarship in the past five years has enthusiastically expanded upon the same themes. 
A general question exists among cultural scholars and historians of why the Holocaust does 
not have the same over-arching significance in Russia as it does in the West. This is a legitimate 
question, but it is often accompanied by the expectation that the Holocaust should occupy the same 
                                                          
2 Timothy Snyder, “Holocaust: The Ignored Reality,” The New York Review of Books, July 16, 2009. 
3 For examples of Western scholarship contributing to the stereotype of complete silence on the Holocaust in the Soviet Union, 
see Randolph Braham, ed., Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994) and, especially, William Korey, The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia (New York: Viking, 1973). For 
an example of early work by Altshuler, see Mordechai Altshuler, Soviet Jewry on the Eve of the Holocaust: A Social and 
Demographical Profile (Yad Vashem: Jerusalem, 1998). Most of his earlier work on the Holocaust in the 1980s consisted of articles 
in the Hebrew journals, e.g., Yalkut Moreshet and Pe’amin, with a list available from http://www.huji.ac.il/dataj. For Gitelman see 
Zvi Gitelman, “History, Memory and Politics: The Holocaust in the Soviet Union,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 5, no. 1 (1990): 
23-37 and “Soviet Reactions to the Holocaust,” in Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey Gurock, eds., The Holocaust in the Soviet Union 
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 3-28.   
 
3 
 
space in the Russian (and previously Soviet) cultural sphere. But an understanding of Soviet 
history and the nature of the Holocaust in the east illuminates the reasons for why these 
expectations are misguided.4 It is true that there is no artistic representation or historic work of the 
Holocaust with such monumental iconic cultural status as Steven Spielberg’s film, but at the time 
of its release Russia was engaging in a small Holocaust boom of its own. In 1992 the Russian 
Research and Educational Holocaust Center was established, and scholars such as Ilya Altman and 
Alla Gerber began work on a new Russian historiography of the Holocaust.  
What then, one might ask, was the ‘old’ historiography? Generally, in the Soviet 
historiography the Nazi’s annihilation of the Jews was referred to as evreiskaia katastrofa (Jewish 
catastrophe), with ‘Holocaust’ only being transliterated into Russian as Kholokost in the 1990s. 
That the Nazis specifically targeted Jews for annihilation and completely destroyed their 
communities was not denied, but it was not recognized as a unique phenomenon.  Rather, it was 
addressed as an aspect of WWII encompassed in greater Soviet suffering. Jews were recognized 
as suffering alongside Belarussians and Ukrainians, for example, but the specific antisemitic nature 
inherent in Nazi ideology was generally not highlighted. Perhaps the most succinct 
characterization is that of “inconsistent silence.”5 That is, what is now referred to as the Holocaust, 
defined as the unique and systematic state-sponsored genocide of Jews by Nazi Germany during 
WWII, was actually quite well documented and represented in the Soviet press and in cinematic 
and literary representation, but it was not interpreted as a uniquely Jewish tragedy.6 In Soviet 
                                                          
4 For an eloquent inquiry into Western critique of Soviet responses to the Holocaust, see Zvi Gitelman, “Politics and the 
Historiography of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union,” in Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 30-31. 
5 For an elaboration on the general albeit quite inconsistent policy of silence regarding the Holocaust and its Jewish specificity, 
see Karel Berkhoff, “The Holocaust in the Soviet Media,” in Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander M. Martin, The 
Holocaust in the East: Local Perpetrators and Soviet Responses (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014), p. 84; Harvey Asher, “The 
Soviet Union, the Holocaust, and Auschwitz” in ibid., p. 44; Karel Berkhoff, Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during 
World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 161; Gitelman, Bitter Legacy, p. 18.  
6 For an in-depth study of this conclusion in the Soviet media, especially photography, see David Shneer, Through Soviet 
Jewish Eyes: Photography, War, and the Holocaust (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Rutgers University Press, 2011); for 
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reporting on Nazi atrocity, the general trend was that Jews were not singled out, but they were not 
completely omitted. Moreover, after 1943 it became Soviet policy to actually identify Jewish 
victims as such more often if they were non-Soviet Jews, as Karel Berkhoff has shown.7 Yet at 
other times, usually when referring to Soviet Jews, they were completely erased.  
Why Jewish suffering was generally either downplayed or erased has been discussed by 
several scholars. Some, such as Berkhoff, see the reasons for it as the result of antisemitism in the 
Soviet Red Army and in the Communist party, in general. Others, such as Harvey Asher, prefer to 
interpret it as a result of general Soviet policy on nationalities. He argues that it was done to avoid 
raising a “Jewish consciousness” that could halt Jewish assimilation into Soviet culture or disturb 
the “sense of unity and resolve that the invasion had created among the Soviet people.”8 And as 
all scholars dealing with this issue have mentioned, there was the risk that if Jewish suffering were 
highlighted, Soviet citizens might begin to perceive the war as a fight “for the Jews,” which might 
alienate other nationalities and dismantle the notion of ‘friendship of the peoples’, or, druzhba 
narodov. All of these reasons assume a Soviet-domestic perspective in that they do not deeply 
explore why local Polish actors may have favored policy that appeared similar to Soviet goals on 
the surface for reasons independent of typical Soviet foreign policy considerations. Of course, 
underlying Soviet strategy should not be dismissed, but a more productive approach might be to 
consider that perhaps the Soviets sometimes felt compelled to abandon their own norms (i.e., for 
wartime propaganda aims or for fulfilling nationalities policy) to accommodate the interests of 
others for a greater political goal. In cases of the media portrayal of Jews during the Holocaust, 
                                                          
cinema, see Jeremy Hicks, First Films of the Holocaust: Soviet Cinema and the Genocide of the Jews, 1938-1946 (University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2012); for literature, see Harriet Murav, Music from a Speeding Train: Jewish Literature in Post-Revolution 
Russia (Stanford University Press, 2011).   
7 Berkhoff, “The Holocaust in the Soviet Media,” in The Holocaust in the East, p. 100. See also Berkhoff, Motherland in 
Danger, p. 149.  
8 Asher, “The Soviet Union, the Holocaust, and Auschwitz,” in The Holocaust in the East, p. 48. See also Gitelman, Bitter 
Legacy, p. 26. 
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there seems to be at least one instance in which non-Soviet interests helped inform a Soviet 
practice, and that is the Soviet liberation of the Nazi death and concentration camp at Majdanek. 
Such a focus shows how the domestic situation in early liberated Poland was shaped by Soviet 
foreign policy, but it also shows in turn how various Polish actors helped shape that policy in the 
context of the formation of their own foreign policy goals.   
It is the goal of this thesis to show how the Polish-Soviet Extraordinary Commission to 
Investigate German crimes at Majdanek reflected broader developments in early Polish-Soviet 
relations, specifically addressing the issue of how early narratives of both victimhood and the 
general nature of the camp were formed and the place of the unique Jewish fate at Majdanek within 
that framework. I show how two reluctant communists occupying leading positions in the PKWN 
(Polish Committee for National Liberation), yet representing oppositional figures in Poland more 
generally (an ethnic Pole and a Jew), felt compelled to negotiate the interests of “their own” with 
the Soviet arbiter. Jewish suffering was ultimately downplayed, as Karel Berkhoff, David Shneer, 
and Jeremy Hicks have discussed in their own studies on Soviet representations of the Holocaust. 
My thesis departs from their studies in that I link the downplaying of Jewish suffering to competing 
Polish perspectives on Majdanek in the context of greater wartime developments. In my discussion 
I focus on the investigational procedure and debates for how the camp should be reported in the 
press rather than the press reports themselves, although I occasionally engage with them.    
If the general Soviet policy after 1943 was to increasingly recognize Jewish suffering as 
such when it concerned non-Soviet Jews, why then would the Soviet press fail to emphasize Jewish 
victims in the case of Majdanek? On the one hand, eastern Poland was under communist influence, 
but on the other it was not a fully annexed Soviet territory. Therefore, it can be expected that Soviet 
reporting on Majdanek might fall somewhere in the middle. More importantly, though, the Poles 
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did not welcome the Soviets’ liberation and subsequent occupation of the Lublin region, as this 
simultaneously ushered in the official establishment of communist and Soviet rule in Poland. The 
Soviets needed Polish support, but most Poles remained loyal to the Polish government-in-exile in 
London. Yet, a much lower but still significant number of Poles did welcome communist rule – 
but a Polish version and not simply a Soviet transplant. When I speak of Polish national interests, 
I mean to include both of these groups. I argue that the necessity of negotiating competing Polish 
national interests in the context of establishing communist rule meant that the Soviets departed 
from their own norms for representing both the Holocaust and wartime victimization. The norm 
would have firstly been to present Majdanek as a broader wartime atrocity in which not just Jewish 
but also Slavic victimization was incorporated into the greater suffering of all nationalities. But as 
Majdanek was outside the Soviet Union, Jews should have theoretically received more recognition. 
Jews were not completely erased, and the narrative of universal suffering was still highly visible, 
but, ultimately, Majdanek was presented primarily as a greater Polish tragedy, while other 
suffering (including that of Russian POWs) was downplayed.  
My thesis is based primarily on an examination of the proceedings of the “Polish-Soviet 
Extraordinary Commission to Examine the Crimes at Majdanek.” I have closely examined several 
protokoly, prisoner/SS officer questionings, observational reports, and the official Communique 
written by the Commission. It is not a coincidence that Andrzej Witos, as Vice-Chairman of the 
PKWN, was also Chairman of the Commission. He was a member of the Peasant Party and head 
of the PKWN Department of Agriculture. He supported gradual land reform and was not 
considered radical by most ordinary Polish citizens, and since the Soviets and Polish communists 
were struggling to gain broader nationalist support, they gave him relative “free hand” because 
they thought he could most easily attract Poland’s largely peasant base and most effectively enact 
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policy.9 If the Red Army soldiers needed Witos’s help securing Soviet order in Lublin and thus an 
overall smooth transition to communism, the Soviet members of the Commission at Majdanek 
would not likely have contested his judgment on the content of the Communique and other related 
documents – none of which reached final versions without his approval as Chairman. Even though 
Majdanek’s Jews were outside the Soviet Union and therefore more likely to have been identified 
as Jews in the Soviet press, Witos – as a non-Jewish Polish national trying to create broad national 
support for communist rule – knew that emphasizing Jewish victimhood would likely antagonize 
the remaining Polish population. Therefore, the Communique and Soviet press reports gave more 
special attention to the general suffering of the Polish population and Soviet POWs at Majdanek, 
both of whom made up a large percentage of Majdanek’s population.  
In addition, I review other Red Army documents on Majdanek that were not related to the 
Commission, as well as a variety of documents specifically concerning the establishment of 
communist rule in Poland in the summer and fall of 1944, particularly in the Lublin region. I rely 
on these documents and extensive secondary reading to allow me to formulate conclusions for why 
timing (i.e., the critical window of flux during which the Soviets were trying to secure communist 
rule in Poland while still fighting the war) and the specific role of Poles under the Emil 
Sommerstein’s and Andrzej Witos’s leadership in the Commission were the two variables in this 
case.  
The most important discussion is centered on my deep reading and comparison of the 
Communique (a summary of the Commission’s findings) published in Pravda with what was 
actually documented in the Commission reports in the previous weeks, including a recorded debate 
in which the question of how to address national specificity and Jewish victimhood was explicitly 
                                                          
9 John Coutouvidis and Jaime Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947, The Politics of Liberation Series, (Leicester University Press, 
1986), pp. 142, 154.  
8 
 
addressed. To show the process by which Jewish suffering was erased during this fluid early post-
war situation, I analyze the debates among Commission members – particularly between Dr. Emil 
Sommerstein and Professor N. I. Grashchenkov – which were recorded by Piotr Sobolewski as 
“Preniia” in the final protocols at the conclusion of the Commission’s investigation. More so than 
the other press reports, a deep focus on the Communique allows one to decipher which information 
transferred from the documents to the press and why the individuals writing it changed what they 
did. 
It is possible to observe a three-step process of investigation, deliberation, and 
representation – all by the same people. Berkhoff writes that as of yet no document has been found 
that illustrates explicit top down directives on Soviet media portrayal of the Jews and that it is 
unlikely that such a document ever existed.10 While I have documents that explicitly show the 
process for how the Soviet and Polish members of the Commission reached a decision on how to 
address ethnic specificity in the press, I do not have any document from a higher Polish or Soviet 
authority approving or disapproving such representation. But in light of the comment from 
Berkhoff mentioned above, it might be assumed that decisions on how to deal with Jewish 
particularity were often individual deliberations arising from the situation at hand and that there 
existed no central directive in Moscow for reporting on Majdanek. The “Preniia” serve as an 
example of how a fluid situation effected the erasure of Jewish suffering in the context of 
establishing communist rule in Catholic Poland, securing communist moral and political authority 
in the post-war world order, and upholding Soviet internationalist values.  
This thesis contributes to both studies of the Holocaust and Soviet history in general. Its 
contribution to Holocaust history was discussed at the beginning of this introduction. That is, a 
                                                          
10 Berkhoff, Motherland in Danger, p. 116. 
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major part of it occurred on Soviet or Soviet-occupied territory. But in terms of its relation to 
Soviet history, incorporating the Holocaust into Soviet studies can help historians better 
understand developments in the early Soviet west, or the territories annexed into the Soviet Union 
during and after WWII.  Historian Tarik Cyril Amar recently produced a study on the Holocaust 
in western Ukraine, specifically Lviv, within the broader context of exploring the Soviet legacy in 
its western areas. He, too, departed from traditionally ‘Soviet lenses’ and addressed his project 
from a perspective of Ukrainian nationalism. He wrote that his project of analyzing Soviet 
Holocaust discourse in Lviv and western Ukraine could be compared with  
the “cases of Soviet satellite states,” in order to “shed new if indirect light on other regions of the 
Soviet west,” suggesting that more attention in Soviet studies should be paid to the national 
interests of those for whom Soviet liberation also meant the establishment of communist rule.11 
He described his own study as a “fresh exploration of the Soviet legacy,” and my thesis can also 
be viewed in such a light.   
Historian Michael David-Fox asserts that World War II has largely been “marginalized in 
the advanced study of Soviet history” for decades by members of both the ‘totalitarian school’ who 
focused on ideology and the ‘revisionist social historians’ who shifted the direction to social 
change from below.12 He calls for further research in which “Soviet history and the history of the 
Holocaust can be advanced simultaneously.”13 This is what I am attempting to do in writing my 
thesis. Within a framework of the ‘internationalization of Soviet history,’ I seek to understand 
aspects of both the Holocaust and its aftermath in the borderlands, as well as Soviet activity in 
these same areas. In this aim, a specific focus on the Soviet liberation of Majdanek in the context 
                                                          
11 Tarik Cyril Amar, “A Disturbed Silence: Discourse on the Holocaust in the Soviet West as an Anti-Site of Memory,” in The 
Holocaust in the East, p. 159. 
12 Michael David-Fox, “Preface: The Holocaust as a Part of Soviet History,” in The Holocaust in the East, pp. vii-viii. 
13 Ibid., p. xii. 
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of establishing communism in the summer and fall of 1944 will thus contribute to Holocaust, 
Soviet, and East European history. 
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CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LUBLIN DURING THE FIRST DAYS 
OF LIBERATION 
 
The Polish Committee on National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, or, 
PKWN) issued a manifesto establishing itself as the new governing power in Poland on July 22, 
1944. This institutional body was favored first by the Soviets over the Polish government-in-exile 
in London (Rząd Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie) under Prime Minister Stanisław 
Mikołajczyk as the legitimate post-liberation government in Poland. However, by the fall of 1944 
it had obtained the support of the rest of the Allies, as well. Mikołajczyk’s government was the 
official successor to the new Polish independent state (officially called the Second Polish Republic) 
that had emerged in the aftermath of WWI. The PKWN was favored by the Soviets because it was 
staffed with Poland’s pro-communist supporters, including members of the Polish Workers’ Party 
(PWP). The PWP (PPR in Polish) was formed in 1942 and was the successor to the Communist 
Party of Poland (KPP in Polish), which had ceased to exist by 1938. Therefore, the Soviets had a 
strong interest in the smooth transition of power to the PKWN, as this would officially usher in 
the establishment of communist rule in Poland and would allow the country to serve as a 
communist buffer between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. However, as will be shown, 
Stalin understood that this would not be easy. Even though the PKWN – especially the PWP – 
closely aligned itself with the Soviets, Stalin exhibited uncertainty in how to deal with the new 
system in Lublin and was careful to avoid indicating any desire for communism in Poland to be a 
transplant of the Soviet version. He understood the sensitivity of competing visions for Poland’s 
future among Poland’s citizens and parties and was well aware of the fact that most Polish citizens 
supported the London government-in-exile. Ultimately, July to October 1944 was a time of flux 
for both the Soviets and the Poles, and this is reflected in the policy decisions of the time. Stalin 
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knew he would need to give Poles leeway in determining their own affairs but was still determined 
to see a smooth transition to communist rule in newly liberated Poland. This much is true for the 
years 1945 and 1946, as well – but the summer and early fall of 1944 was a time where this political 
vision was confronted with ambivalence by both the Soviets and Poles.  
In July 1944 Chełm was the first city to be liberated west of the Curzon line, which had 
been established as the border between Poland and Bolshevik Russia after WWI. The border would 
be shifted west in 1945, but at this time Chełm  was the first town in Poland ‘proper,’ even though 
there were ethnically Polish cities to the east of it. Therefore, the PKWN established their 
manifesto declaring communist rule here on July 24th. The Red Army entered the Lublin region 
that same day and had fully established control in the city by July 24th.14 On the very same day the 
PKWN was posting its manifesto and the Soviets were pushing further into the Lublin region, the 
Nazi officers in control of the Majdanek concentration and death camp were preparing the final 
transports of remaining prisoners for deportation to Auschwitz in anticipation of the Red Army’s 
arrival.  
 In most of the literature addressing the Soviets’ penetration into the Lublin region – the 
first major step in claiming German-occupied territory – Majdanek is not centrally addressed.15 It 
seems that the liberation of the camp was of secondary importance to broader wartime 
developments in Poland around the same time that citizens did not consider synonymous with 
liberation. Poles did not perceive the Soviets as liberators, generally speaking. Instead of 
“liberation” the term “likwidacja,” or liquidation, was used to describe Soviet activity at Majdanek 
                                                          
14  For a detailed study of the establishment of communist rule in Poland see Krystyna Kersten, The Establishment of 
Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).  
15 For example, Kersten, The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland; Halik Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed: Poland 
and the Poles in the Second World War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Poland; Neither 
is it discussed in the documents collected in these two sources: Antony Polonsky, ed., The Great Powers and the Polish Question, 
1941-45: A Documentary Study in Cold War Origins (The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1976) and idem. 
and Bolesław Drukier, eds., The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland (London: Routledge, 1980).  
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because after liberating the camp Red Army officers converted one of the fields into an NKVD 
camp to intern prisoners of the Polish Home Army (AK, or Armia Krajowa) who had been accused 
of sabotaging the war effort. 16  This is one of the early reasons for why Poles failed to see the 
Soviets as liberators. “Liquidation” refers to the internment or shooting of such soldiers but the 
term also became applied to Soviet actions more broadly which were defined by Poles as hostile.17 
A Jewish survivor of the Holocaust recalled how when he returned to Lublin in 1946 “the marble 
monument that was erected to the memory of the liberators of the city [of Lublin] was violated 
daily.” 18  The liberation of Majdanek also occurred simultaneously with the ill-favored 
establishment of communism in Poland. Most studies of the summer and fall of 1944 in Poland 
focus on this aspect. But it would be highly problematic to assume that there was no support among 
Poles at all for the Soviet occupants and communism, in general. Marci Shore’s work of 
intellectual and cultural history shows the vibrancy of Marxism in Poland among intellectuals, but 
scholars have also pointed out that there were left-leaning trends in more traditional sectors, such 
as in the Peasant Party.19 But those who were avid supporters of communism and the PWP wanted 
a Polish version. For example, Roman Werfel – the leading Polish communist ideologue – in 
drawing on a metaphor from French relations with the Pope in Rome said in an interview from 
June-November 1982:  
“[There were those] who thought that the basic principles of the faith should be 
decided by the Pope in Rome, but that decisions specific to France were better left 
                                                          
16 Państwowe Muzeum na Majdanku, ed., Państwowe Muzeum na Majdanku w latach 1944-1947: Wybór dokumentów 
(Lublin: Wydawnictwo, 2004), p. 5, pp. 55-56. 
17 For more on this see Ryszard Terlecki, ch. 2, “Pobój: Narzędzia zbrodni” in Miecz i Tarcza Komunizmu: Historia aparatu 
bezpieczenstwa w Polsce 1944-1990 (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2007), pp. 41-75. 
18  David Zabludovsky, “Horrors, Death and Destruction (Experiences of a Holocaust Survivor)” (Hebrew), trans. Ziva 
Rosenhand, www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/zabludow/zab143.html#Page149 (accessed April 4, 2015). Here “violated” probably 
means destructed or defiled. This testimony is also presented in Jan Marek Chodakiewicz, After the Holocaust: Polish-Jewish 
Conflict in the Wake of WWII (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2003), p. 70.  
19 Kersten, The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, pp. 47, 50. See also Marci Shore, Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw 
Generation's Life and Death in Marxism, 1918–1968 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
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to the French themselves. I transposed their thinking onto Polish-Soviet relations. 
We in Poland knew better what was needed.”20 
Werfel spent most of the war period in Central Asia and Moscow shortly after becoming a member 
of the VKP(b) (All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), but when he returned to Poland it was 
to Lublin in July 1944. Both in Russia and in Poland he served as the editor of several Polish 
communist newspapers. When the interviewer asked him to give a specific example of a Polish 
national consideration for implementing communism, he said that collectivization was the first 
thing that came to mind, rather than circumspection about Jews. Werfel was of Jewish origin 
himself, but he understood that communism would go sour in Poland if non-Polish citizens 
perceived it as a primarily Jewish system. He said that this was why communists spent considerable 
energy keeping Jews out of the internal trade structures in Poland, but in the same interview he 
indicated that the Soviets should have applied the same policy to the security apparatus – “Johnny 
has to be beaten by Johnny, and not by Moshe,” he said.21 Of course, this was an observation he 
made in retrospect and in reference to Jewish presence in interrogation rooms. But it is known that 
post-war Jewish-Polish relations were tense, especially in the eastern territories. There was the 
strong perception among Poles that a depolonization of the ‘kresy’, or borderland areas making up 
the Soviet west and Polish east, was taking place in the summer to fall of 1944, coinciding with 
their “harassment” by the communists. Jews were not perceived as also being harassed.22 
In regard to Polish perceptions of early post-war Soviet rule and Jewish participation in it, 
Daniel Blatman asserts that even if Poles “acknowledged the Red Army as the agent that had ended 
the occupation” in the first weeks after liberation, it did not take long for the Polish population to 
                                                          
20 Interview of Roman Werfel in Teresa Torańska, ‘Oni’: Stalin’s Polish Puppets (London: Collins and Harvill, 1987), p. 118. 
21 Ibid., p. 109.  
22 Chodakiewicz, After the Holocaust, p. 120 – This book provides a unique and insightful perspective, but one should read it 
cautiously. Alexander V. Prusin, The Lands Between The Lands Between: Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870-1992 
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“quickly change its mind about the foreign forces that were now garrisoned on Polish soil.”23 This 
was because they began to perceive that Jews were overwhelmingly in control in the Lublin area, 
although in actuality Poles and Ukrainians were much more politically active and institutionally 
involved in the new regime than Jews were. However, the perception that Jews were in control 
remained popular. This was a continuation of the legacy of the derogatory notion of Żydokomuna 
(Jewish Communism) from the Bolshevik Revolution and especially the Polish-Soviet War in 
1920. Blatman asserted that the PKWN itself “had no clear policy toward the Jewish population 
in post-liberation Poland.”24 But it seems that a great many Polish citizens themselves did – and 
not a positive one.25 Any study of early post-war Poland must necessarily consider the Jewish issue 
as a Polish national consideration. In Poland there had already been a long tradition of defining 
national identity in terms of the exclusion of the ethnic and religious Jewish ‘other’. The war 
exacerbated Polish-Jewish tensions and further alienated the Jewish population. A government 
perceived as overwhelmingly Jewish would automatically render opposition and skepticism, 
regardless of policy. 
Before moving forward, it is necessary to backtrack a bit to the question of collectivization. 
It is already known that the Soviets changed their policy on collectivization in Belarus and eastern 
Poland in 1939. For a while they deliberately avoided collectivization and instead divided up large 
estates and distributed the land to peasants. Martin Myant says that this was for a larger Soviet 
political goal of gaining widespread support among those whose territory they had recently 
occupied.26 Land reform seems to be a recurring variable in the Soviets’ approach towards peoples 
                                                          
23 Daniel Blatman, “The Encounter between Jews and Poles in Lublin District after Liberation, 1944-1945,” East European 
Politics and Societies 20, no. 4 (November 2006): p. 613.  
24 Ibid., p. 612. 
25 See, for example, Prusin, The Lands Between, Joshua D. Zimmerman, ed., Contested Memories: Poles and Jews during the 
Holocaust and Its Aftermath (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003) and Norman Davies and Antony Polonsky, 
eds., Jews in Eastern Poland and the USSR, 1939-46 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).  
26 Martin Myant, Poland: A Crisis for Socialism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982), p. 11.    
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in the kresy. This was the case at the onset of the war, and it was also a key issue for Poles in the 
summer of 1944 – perhaps even more pressing. The historian Alexander Prusin defined land 
reform as “the focal point of the struggle for power between the Soviet government and its 
opponents.”27  
If the Soviets were willing to modify their policy towards collectivization in order to 
assuage dissent in 1939, it seems plausible that they would then alter other policies for the same 
purposes near the war’s end. It was in some ways a very similar situation. In September 1939 
(shortly after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed) the Soviets modified their policy of 
collectivization so as to win the support of the non-Polish minorities in eastern Poland, while in 
1944 they modified their approach to reporting wartime atrocity in effort to gain the support of the 
Polish majority. However, the basic set up was the same. That is, the territory in question was 
under occupation from two sides by opposing governments. Whereas minorities may have seen 
one regime as the lesser of two evils, the Soviets would have to work harder to appease the Polish 
ethnic majority who viewed the Soviet and Nazi occupations as equally evil. In both cases, the 
Soviet government needed to appeal to those whose interests might belie a smooth transition to 
localized Soviet control. In 1939 the Soviets regarded the national minorities (Ukrainians and 
Belarussians) of eastern Poland as most significant, while by 1944 the focus had fully switched to 
the same region’s national ethnically Polish majority.  
 In considering the history of nationalism and socialism in Poland during the summer of 
liberation, Myant gives a concise statement on the Soviet approach to establishing communism in 
Poland: “Stalin’s aim was to ensure that he had a totally reliable regime in Poland, but it ideally 
should be a stable regime broadly acceptable to the Polish people.”28 This sentiment is indicated 
                                                          
27 Prusin, The Lands Between, p. 223. 
28 Ibid., p. 17.   
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in a report from August 18-19, 1944, by Prime Minister Mikołajczyk to the Delegate of the 
(London) Government in Poland. He was writing to convey messages from his previous 
correspondence with Stalin and to confirm that he would be traveling to Warsaw to meet with 
members of the PWP so that they might work together to reorganize the Polish government with 
participation of members from both the PWP and the London government-in-exile. In this dispatch 
Mikołajczyk stated that “such a solution would at once create a wide basis in Poland for a Polish-
Soviet co-operation.”29 After hearing Mikołajczyk’s proposition, Stalin expressed approval of it in 
the hopes that an agreement between the two sides could somehow still result. In Mikołajczyk’s 
dispatch to the delegate in Warsaw, he described how in his meeting with Stalin the Marshal had 
“expressed a hope that the Poles would eventually come to an agreement between themselves.”30 
He concluded his report by conjecturing that the Soviet Government had “not yet finally sided 
with the communists [even if the PWP was trying to side with it], still leaving a margin for 
compromise” and that for the time being it has “given a free hand to communists” while still in 
flux about “whether Poland should be Sovietized.”31  
 In a meeting between Mikołajczyk and Stalin a couple weeks earlier, much of the same 
sentiments were reflected in their conversation. Mikołajczyk implored Stalin to “take the interests 
of Poland into consideration” to which Stalin replied: 
                                                          
29 “Dispatch from M. Mikołajczyk to the Delegate of the Government in Poland with an account of his visit to Moscow,” 
London, August 18-19, 1944, trans. from Polish in The Sikorski Institute, ed., Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1943-1945, 
vol. 2 of Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945 (London: Heinemann, 1967), p. 350.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
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“In my opinion, the Polish nation must not follow the lead of the Soviet Union, but 
walk side by side with it. Poland has to take her own course, but it can be parallel 
to that pursued by the Soviet Union.”32 
Of course, such statements coming from Stalin should be taken with a grain of salt, but there is no 
reason to believe that it is completely insincere. In this conversation which took place in early 
August, Stalin expressed hope that Mikołajczyk would eventually come closer to reaching some 
kind of understanding with the PKWN on the question of leadership in newly liberated Poland. 
But in another conversation Mikołajczyk tried to convince Stalin to sympathize more acutely with 
the London Government by telling him that there were not even any “serious socialists within the 
Committee of National Liberation.”33 He then mentioned Andrzej Witos (who was a chair member 
of the PKWN and head of the Agricultural Department) as an example, claiming that Witos was 
not really representative of the Peasant Party. Stalin simply replied that due to wartime 
considerations “new men have become important in Poland and it would be impossible to call 
upon old authorities only.”34 Marci Shore writes that even at the Union of Polish Patriots in 
Moscow in 1943, Poles who had “never even been communist sympathizers” were summoned to 
Moscow.35 So it is possible that Stalin was already aware of Witos’s reluctance to completely 
embrace communism.   
Of course, Stalin was not assuring Mikołajczyk that Poland’s national interests would be 
met for their own sake. The conversations above took place in early August, but on the very day 
                                                          
32 “Note on the conversation between M. Mikołajczyk and Marshal Stalin relating to the renewed attempts at an understanding 
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the Soviets entered Lublin and took control of it on July 23 Stalin sent a letter to Churchill 
confirming that he would not recognize the London Government as legitimate and would instead 
favor “a Provisional Polish Government made up of democratic forces” which those in London 
might hope to later join.36 The ‘democratic forces’ were, of course, those which had expressly 
aligned themselves with the Soviet authorities within the institutional body of the PKWN (made 
up largely of PWP sympathizers or full-fledged members). But the fact that the Soviets were 
liberating Poland did not imply “an easy road to power” for the PWP and the PKWN by proxy.37 
Stalin recognized this, so he would not have gotten rid of someone like Witos for lack of 
communist vigor. In fact, he likely would have wanted to keep the PKWN staffed with a few 
people like Witos for precisely such a reason. Mikołajczyk was trying to discredit the PKWN by 
highlighting Witos’s reluctance, but for Stalin this was a non-issue. There was no question that the 
PKWN would serve as the legitimizing institution and structural governing body in Lublin and, 
therefore, for Poland, in general (although Warsaw and the west were still under Nazi occupation).  
Furthermore, although the PKWN was mostly supported by the PWP, there were still three 
other parties in addition to the PWP constituting this “alliance of the left.”38  But when Stalin 
assured Mikołajczyk that he would take Polish interests seriously he understood the necessity of 
balancing the varying interests of the left. However, it is worth repeating that the large majority of 
Poles still supported Mikołajczyk’s government in London, even after liberation of the eastern 
territories. They were primarily peasants for whom issues of land reform were most pressing but 
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also for whom Polish culture was equated with Catholic culture.39 Stalin would need to balance 
the interests of an incohesive left with the interests of the rest of the traditionally-minded nation 
who saw communism as a foreign imposition. The Catholic Church had a long tradition of strength 
in Poland and was inherently tied to Polish nationalism. The war had strengthened this connection, 
and the bond between people and church was more intricate in Poland than in any other Central or 
East European territories with a Catholic tradition that came under Soviet control during and after 
the war. Political scientist Pedro Ramet wrote that “only in Poland… did the communist regime 
hesitate.”40 Ramet also pointed out that it was only in Poland that anti-communist armed resistance 
continued for two or three years after the war’s end.  
Even if Stalin’s promise to consider Polish national interests was somewhat cynical, it was 
not insincere. Looking after Poland’s interests meant delegitimizing the London Government 
while simultaneously not alienating those who supported it. He also needed at the same time to 
create security for the PKWN and compel the nation it to cede its eastern territories, as during this 
time Churchill and Stalin renewed discussions on shifting the Curzon line. These were the issues 
on the table, but Poles would control implementation of Soviet-generated policy at the local level, 
at least during this period of flux from July to October. 41  While the Soviets considered the 
establishment of the PKWN and the cession of its eastern territories uncontestable, questions of 
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religion and land reform were apparently negotiable. The place of religion in Polish national 
identity would ultimately prove the more important factor for how members of the Polish-Soviet 
Commission addressed Jewish specificity at Majdanek. 
*** 
As mentioned in the introduction, Andrzej Witos supported gradual land reform and was 
not considered radical by Poles. Therefore, the Soviet authorities gave him a relatively “free hand” 
in policy.42 Apparently, he had only become a Polish communist activist after being retrieved from 
a Soviet labor camp in Siberia and had, indeed, been exhibiting this free hand by opposing 
proposed agricultural reforms among more pro-Soviet members in the late summer of 1944.43  Dr. 
Emil Sommerstein shared a similar fate. He, too, had been arrested by the NKVD and sent to the 
Gulag before being released in 1941 and recruited into the (Soviet) Union of Polish Patriots. He, 
like Witos, was also present at its first Congress in Moscow in 1943 and represented another 
member of the Polish Union who had previously not sympathized with communism.44 It seems 
there were more than a few. Sommerstein – a prominent leader of Polish Jewry and outspoken 
advocate of Zionism – was also sent to Lublin in July 1944 to serve as a member of the PKWN 
and on August 18 became a member of the committee for Polish Jews in the USSR which was 
organized under the auspices of the Union of Polish Patriots.   
How is it that two seemingly opposing figures, in relation to the Polish/Jewish question in 
a Polish national context, would both end up serving together on the PKWN? It reflects the fact 
that – although certainly left and largely pro-Soviet – the PKWN was not a uniform ‘left.’ Jaff 
Schatz writes that during the summer of 1944 the Soviets were willing to recruit into the new 
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Soviet-backed Polish army members with only very loose ties to the left, including Zionists, with 
the assumption that “after a short period of basic instruction [they could] be promoted into the 
political apparatus.”45 From an internal Soviet viewpoint, neither Witos nor Sommerstein seemed 
like the typical people the Soviets would have wanted representing a government which they 
sought to legitimize, with Witos being a less than enthusiastic Polish communist and Sommerstein 
being not only a Jew but a Zionist one at that. The PKWN was a project to legitimize the 
provisional government in the eyes of primarily, the Polish people, but also for international eyes. 
There were not that many Polish communists at the time, so the Soviets likely would have made 
concessions for someone like Sommerstein. He previously had no communist leanings and had 
sympathized with a form of Zionism that favored creating a new homeland based on capitalist 
economics. Jakub Berman, the most prominent communist in the PKWN, and Yitzhak Zuckerman, 
a leading figure in the Jewish Fighting Organization and instrumental in leading the Warsaw 
Uprising, had expressed amazement that Sommerstein “as a rightist Zionist” had joined a pro-
communist government.46 When Zuckerman asked him how this had happened, Sommerstein said 
that one of his interrogators had come to him with two options – “to stay in jail or to be a 
minister.”47 After hearing his reply the interrogators “took him out of jail, dressed him, [and] 
brought him to Moscow.”48 Zuckerman wrote that Sommerstein understood that this was because 
“they [the Soviets] needed him so they could appear to the outside world with a government that 
included a Zionist representative, since they had to consider the United States and world Jewish 
opinion.”49 And thus a Zionist became a representative of a Polish (albeit a Soviet-backed) body. 
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 It is likely the Soviets had even more misgivings about people like Witos but ultimately 
decided to perceive his ‘flaws’ (i.e., nationalist leanings, long-standing indifference to communism) 
not as detrimental to the communist project but rather as useful in the Polish context. This speaks 
to the flux of the early post-war situation during the months of July to October 1944 – both in 
terms of divisive currents with Polish society at that time and the Soviets’ need to negotiate them 
in order to fulfill their own interests in seeing a successful implementation of communism and 
obtaining the eastern territories (with the approval of the western Allies).  
Witos and Sommerstein occupied instrumental rather than ideologically sanctioned 
positions in the PKWN. They likely became members of the Extraordinary Commission at 
Majdanek because their primary positions of authority as leaders in the PKWN made it only natural 
that they would occupy key positions on the Commission. Although both operated under the 
general task of furthering Polish communism, each of them was uniquely suited to negotiating the 
interests of ‘their own’ – Jews and ethnic Poles. Their role on the Majdanek Commission was one 
way for them to exercise their particular briefs, briefs which provide a lens through which we can 
see how still ambiguous questions of Jewish-Polish-Soviet relations were being worked out in the 
period of flux in the summer to early fall of 1944.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE POLISH-SOVIET EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION TO 
INVESTIGATE GERMAN CRIMES IN THE AREA OF LUBLIN AT MAJDANEK 
 
On August 17, 1944, a statement issued by Polpress (the publishing agency set up by the Polish 
Committee for National Liberation, or PKWN) appeared in the PKWN’s official newspaper 
Rzesczpospolita announcing the creation of the Polish-Soviet Extraordinary Commission at 
Majdanek for investigating the crimes the Germans had committed in Lublin. Investigations had 
been going on since the Red Army first entered Majdanek in late July, and the Commission used 
several of those reports in their own investigation, which likely began around the end of the first 
week of August. Reportage independent of the Commission had already appeared in the Soviet 
press as early as August 10. But the Commission is considered separately in this thesis because it 
represented a conscious decision by Poles and Soviets to collaborate while investigating Majdanek 
and allows for a more direct conception of the development of early post-war Polish-Soviet 
relations. The Commission mirrored developments that were happening in the Lublin area more 
broadly. That is, it reflected an institutionally domestic creation to serve Polish interests but was 
under Soviet influence and its de facto authority.  
 The Polpress statement of August 17 mentioned that on the outskirts of Lublin in the camp 
at Majdanek the Germans had carried out mass murders of Soviet prisoners-of-war and of 
imprisoned Poles, Frenchmen, Czechs, Jews, Belgians, Austrians, Serbs, Greeks, and those of 
many other nationalities. The report stated that in special consideration of the fact that the Germans 
carried out mass murders of Soviet POWs, the PKWN appealed to the Soviet authorities and 
requested permission to create an extraordinary commission to investigate the crimes at Majdanek, 
to which the Soviets agreed.50 As a site of wartime atrocity committed by the Germans, Majdanek 
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remained under control of the Red Army. As all military sites in Poland were under strict control 
of the Red Army, the Poles would have had to cede authority to the Soviets on all matters relating 
to the camp.51 Poles – even members of the Soviet favored PKWN – would have had to obtain 
permission before setting up any sort of official commission at Majdanek. Thus the PKWN 
members may have considered that by pointing out the prominence of Soviet POWs at Majdanek, 
they could appeal to Soviet sensitivities and would likely receive permission to set up a 
commission more easily.  
 It is apparent that this was a Polish-initiated commission, several of whom were either 
members of the PKWN or prominent Polish figures in Lublin. Of the ten members of the 
commission, only three were Soviet. Yet, it appears that Professor N. I. Grashchenkov, a Soviet 
member, exercised a large degree of weight in the process.  
Members of the Commission  
Andrzej Witos – Chairman (Vice-Chairman of the PKWN) 
Professor D. I. Kudriavtsev – Vice-Chairman (USSR) 
Dr. Emil Sommerstein (member of the PKWN) 
Professor N. I. Grashchenkov (USSR) 
Professor V. I. Prozorovskii (USSR) 
Reverend Dr. Kruszyński (Dean of the Lublin Catholic Cathedral) 
Dr. Ludwik Christians (Chairman of the Lublin Red Cross Society) 
Professor Leon Białkowski (of the Lublin Catholic University) 
Professor Mieczysław Popławski (of the Lublin University) 
Zuzia Balcerzak (Procurator of the Lublin Appeal Court) 
Czesław Szczepański (President of the Lublin Circuit Court) 
Piotr Sobolewski – Secretary  (position seems purely administrative)   
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The following sections will illuminate what was learned about the nature of Majdanek and 
its victims during the commission’s investigations and place this within the greater context of early 
Polish-Soviet relations in the late summer and fall of 1944 – especially concerning the Jewish issue.  
  
*** 
“No one liberated me from Majdanek: the Germans retreated and I walked out after 
them.”52 These are the words Waldemar Lotnik used to describe his escape from the camp on July 
20, 1944. Only a few guards remained at Majdanek and most of the prisoners had already been 
either killed or transported elsewhere.53 Therefore, the Soviets encountered a camp largely empty 
of prisoners and German officers, but otherwise it was essentially in the same condition as it had 
been functioning for the last three years. In the early days after liberation those occupying the 
territory at Majdanek consisted mostly of Red Army soldiers and personnel from the 69th Army 
of the Belarussian Front. From August 2-3 a small commission of officers from this group began 
further investigating the camp. The Germans had set fire to the crematorium before evacuating, 
but only the wooden frames were destroyed, and the brick ovens remained intact. The Soviets 
began examining the crematorium and collecting other camp objects. Over the next couple of 
weeks various bodies, such as groups of Red Army officers of the Red Army and Polish medical 
commissions, continued to investigate the camp until the dual Polish and Soviet Commission was 
established in mid-August. 
At 10:00 am on the morning of August 18, 1944, the Polish-Soviet Extraordinary 
Commission to Investigate German Atrocities at Majdanek in the Area of Lublin officially 
commenced. This was the first time that all members of the Commission assembled together for a 
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general meeting. Chairman of the Commission Andrzej Witos opened with a solemn speech in 
which he alluded to the fact that the crimes at Majdanek were fundamentally different from other 
war crimes, even hinting that a critique of humanity’s understanding of western ‘civilization’ 
might be necessary – “the gravity of the crimes is even more severe if we allow ourselves to 
consider the fact that the organizers and perpetrators were Germans who call themselves the most 
cultured, most civilized people.”54 He condemned Britain and America for not seriously perceiving 
the great danger fascist ideology posed for Poles and the Slavic peoples, in general, but praised the 
Soviet Union for recognizing that there did exist peoples in Europe who would destroy women 
and children “with the help of cultural means,” referring to modern technologies and scientific 
ideologies of race.  
One should not diminish the Soviet and Polish recognition that a hatred of Slavic peoples 
was inherent to Nazi ideology – after all, the German Operation Ost was specifically implemented 
to colonize east and central European territories, which would necessitate the killing of Slavs in 
general. Yet what Witos’s speech and the Commission documents subsequently to be analyzed 
reveal is that despite evidence seemingly pointing to Jews as the primary victims of the Nazis’ 
genocidal policy, neither the Soviets nor the Poles interpreted it as such. The difficult question is 
whether or not their refusal to recognize the inherent nature of antisemitism to Nazi ideology was 
an active choice to subvert Jewish victimhood or what one might call a ‘legitimate 
misinterpretation’ based on sincerity in the context of war in the east where, as Harvey Asher says, 
“the contrast between Jewish and non-Jewish deaths was less sharp.”55  
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It appears that the answer contains aspects of both. After all, Red Army officials all 
throughout the war were informed of the specifically Jewish devastation of Nazi atrocities in 
relation to those of other peoples. For example, in one of several Red Army documents detailing 
Jewish suffering at the Treblinka death camp, an inhabitant of the Polish village Radoszyce 
revealed that “in Treblinka there were two camps. One Jewish, the other Polish. …[T]hey brought 
the Jews into the camp only to exterminate them.”56 It can be inferred that while Poles and Jews 
may have been in the same camp, Poles might be killed while Jews were necessarily killed.  
At the same time – even in consideration of Ilya Ehrenburg’s wartime reports indicating 
Jewish devastation in Eastern Europe – the scale of it was not fully perceived even by Jews 
themselves in the immediate period following the first liberation. It also should be pointed out that 
Jewish victimhood in the Holocaust truly emerged in western memory culture only in the 1960s, 
and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s and Jean-Luc Nancy’s critical essay “The Nazi Myth” (which 
explicitly placed antisemitism and the necessity for annihilating the Jews as inherent to the Nazi 
variant of fascism) only appeared in 1990.  Majdanek was initially built to detain Soviet POWs 
and the number of non-Jewish Poles who perished or were imprisoned there was large. Therefore, 
it should not come as completely surprising that the Soviets and Poles might largely downplay 
Jewish suffering at Majdanek.  
Yet, to say that they did not notice that there was something particular about the Jewish 
‘aspect’ would be incorrect. Majdanek can be seen as the platform from which the (still malleable) 
stance on Jewish issues in early post-war Soviet-Polish relations began to develop. The 
Commission gives one the chance to examine the development more clearly. In his speech at the 
                                                          
56 Document 113, “Lager’ Treblinka,” “Pokazaniia zhitelia derevni Rados’ts’ Mecheslava Anyshkevicha,” in F. D. Sverdlov, 
Dokumenty Obviniaiut: Kholokost: svidetel’stva Krasnoi Armii (Moscow: Rossiiskaia Biblioteka Kholokosta, 1996), p. 97 
(originally from TsAMO SSSR (Tsentral’nyi Arkhiv Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik [Central 
Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union]), fond 65-i armii, opis 10510, delo 113, list 190).  
29 
 
Commission’s first general meeting, Witos first referred to “the extermination of Poles, Russian 
prisoners-of-war, Jews, and representatives of almost all the peoples of Europe” – but by noting 
that “greatest were the number of victims among the Polish people” and arguing for the need to 
“emphasize the danger of ‘Germanism’ for [first and foremost] Poland and its neighbors,” Witos 
framed Majdanek as a primarily Polish site of atrocity, with Poles above not only Jews but even 
the Russian POWs in the hierarchy of suffering. As Witos and others pushed for Polish emphasis, 
the Soviet members did not prohibit them from doing so. This is likely because the Poles also gave 
what was probably more sincere than simple “lip-service” to Soviet propaganda norms about 
universal suffering and victory. Witos established from the beginning that they were examining a 
specifically Polish site. Yet, always residing just below the surface, arising here and there, was the 
thought that perhaps there was something more unique about the Jews. Although apparent to all, 
it was Dr. Emil Sommerstein who would try - and ultimately fail - to urge the other members to 
recognize the specifically Jewish nature of Majdanek and to report the atrocity as such in the press.  
In his reports to a foreign press outlet, Sommerstein made several appeals to America, 
Britain, and Canada to recognize Jewish destruction. A correspondent of the Jewish Telegraphic 
Agency arrived in Lublin after the Commission was already underway. On August 30 the 
correspondent reported that “two-thirds of the…[victims]…of the notorious Majdanek 
‘extermination camp’ near Lublin were Jews” and that Sommerstein had particularly emphasized 
this.57 The report mentioned that Sommerstein had also emphasized the fact that “[i]t must be 
remembered that survival of Jews in Poland under the Nazis is in itself a miracle. The survival of 
1,000 Jews in the area where Jews were massacred in the hundreds of thousands is an act 
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surpassing human understanding.”58 Although the total extent of Jewish devastation in Poland and 
Europe was not yet fully perceived during this time, Sommerstein was in a position to gauge that 
Jews, indeed, had been severely and uniquely impacted by the war. This was reflected in his 
prediction that “[t]he total number of Jews in Poland after all evacuees will return to their home 
towns will not exceed 250,000 as compared with the 3,500,000 that lived there before the war.” 
He was able to make such statements because since late July and early August the Jewish 
Committee in Lublin – of which he was the head – had been registering all liberated Jews in the 
eastern territories of Poland at the committee’s headquarters at number 8 Rybna Street so that they 
might be repatriated to their home towns and reconnected with surviving relatives. As head of the 
PKWN Department for War Reparations, Sommerstein was also working hard on repatriating 
Polish Jews who had fled to the Soviet Union before or early during the war. Even though there 
was apparently a strong sentiment for revenge among Jews in the liberated eastern territories, 
Sommerstein also knew that many Jews would desire to quickly emigrate from Poland so that 
“they could spend their remaining years away from the horrors which they have suffered,” despite 
the promises of tolerance and projections of a better life for Jews in a new communist Poland.59 
His work in Lublin in his daily interactions with surviving Jews exposed him to the devastation of 
Polish Jewry before the total extent of it was even fully known.  
Negotiating simultaneously the Soviet/PKWN interests and the greater national interests 
of the Polish government in London, Sommerstein was in a precarious position. Furthermore, as 
responsible for representing the interests of Poland’s Jewish population in general, Sommerstein 
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found himself in a difficult situation with regard to the Polish Jews in the London government who 
were eager to contact him but were refraining from doing so until a general agreement between 
the PKWN and London Government had been reached.60 A report from the Polish Jews in London 
stated that they were “reluctant to make any independent moves” before hearing from Sommerstein 
on new developments in reaching an agreement between the two sides because ultimately they felt 
that “the policy of Polish Jews here [in London] must be subordinated to considerations of major 
Polish policy and must follow the line of the Polish Government.”61 Yet, as has been shown, the 
likelihood of the London Poles reaching an agreement with the PKWN was quite slim, as Stalin 
ultimately sought to secure PKWN interests while not antagonizing the rest of the population. 
Sommerstein was in the uncomfortable position of having to negotiate several competing Polish, 
Jewish, and Soviet interests, and it seems that he was not faring well.  
Sommerstein was aware that Jews were being indiscriminately targeted by the Nazis before 
he joined the Commission at Majdanek. Yitzhak Zuckerman (a well-known Jewish partisan who 
fought in the Warsaw Uprising) recalled Sommerstein’s anxiety over Stalin’s stance on the Jewish 
question, especially in the context of the wartime suffering of European Jewry. He had been 
hopeful of Stalin’s support, likely for both Jewish immigration to Israel and more proactive 
solutions to the destruction of Polish Jewry (i.e., reparations and aid, employment, housing, and 
perhaps more audible promises of tolerance for Jews under the PKWN). At a meeting in Moscow 
shortly after the PKWN manifesto had been posted in Chełm and before having been sent to Lublin, 
Sommerstein apprehensively approached Stalin “at the right moment” during a reception at the 
Kremlin and apparently (after a few glasses of wine) asked Stalin: “Here’s what happened to the 
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Jewish people and they were destroyed. Don’t you think this question of the Jewish people, of 
those who survived, should be on the agenda of the international forum and receive an international 
solution?”62 According to Zuckerman, Stalin then “twisted the right side of his moustache and then 
the left” before replying – “Budet! (It will be done!)”63 Zuckerman and Sommerstein looked at one 
another, neither of them knowing the meaning of Stalin’s response. Zuckerman was apprehensive 
of the new Soviet rule but still considered the possibility that it would “be good for the Jews” – or 
at least “the Jewish remnant.”64 Sommerstein generally felt the same (even if he personally favored 
Jewish immigration to Palestine), but his work on the Commission was proving trying. In the 
absence of any clear signal from Stalin and with no official Soviet stance on the Jewish issue in 
newly liberated Poland yet apparent, Sommerstein was struggling between the need to publicize 
and emphasize the uniquely Jewish destruction in Poland abroad in order to make the tragedy 
known (and to obtain aid for reparations) and the task of acting in the greater interest of Poland as 
it was perceived by other members.  
In a private conversation in Lublin with Zuckerman, Sommerstein revealed to him that he 
was depressed, and Zuckerman recalled how he got the impression that he felt alienated in 
Lublin.65 Zuckerman and Sommerstein had discussed the extermination camps at Majdanek and 
Treblinka and speculated on the situation in western Poland. Zuckerman wrote about Lublin that 
“at that time, people were involved in the Jewish issue whom I hadn’t known before and whom I 
didn’t respect.”66 One might surmise that he was referring to the Polish members of the PKWN 
who opposed Zionism or failed to perceive the depth of Jewish suffering in the war or who were 
in some way alienating Jewish partisans fighting in the underground or in the actual Home Army. 
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On the other hand, he could have been referring to the actions of certain Jewish leaders in Lublin. 
Regardless of the actual reason for Zuckerman’s distrust of those involved in the Jewish issue, his 
statement reveals that there were tensions between Sommerstein and others dealing with such 
questions – and one might guess that these tensions existed between Sommerstein and the other 
Commission members.  
 
*** 
Although in the Communique the Commission relied heavily on eyewitness testimonies, it 
based much of its actual investigation on the “logic of proof.” When the Soviets documented 
wartime atrocity, they preferred to collect massive amounts of tangible and observable evidence 
rather than rely on eyewitness testimonies, but this does not necessarily mean they always 
disregarded such testimonies. In chapter three it will be discussed how the Commission selectively 
used eyewitness testimony to corroborate their own interpretations of material evidence. But by 
emphasizing the tendency to operate by the “logic of proof,” one can show how the erasure of 
Jewish suffering was so easily effected. Jeremy Hicks writes that “whereas western representations 
[of the Holocaust] rely on witness testimony, Soviet depictions operate on the logic of proof.”67 
One of the main arguments of Hicks’s scholarship is that evidence of what is now called the 
Holocaust was actually meticulously collected by Soviet investigatory commissions, reporters, and 
filmmakers and presented without interpretation. The Commission collected evidence in order to 
determine the finest details about aspects of Majdanek such as daily regimes and nutrition, as well 
as the logistics of the gas chambers and means of extermination.68 Witos also ordered that the 
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special forensic-medical commission already working since August 4th be incorporated into the 
greater Commission’s investigation. They would examine not only the survivors but the masses of 
corpses found at the camp – some of which were in mass graves, others of which were lying in 
various places around the camp, such as near the crematoria.  
One example illustrating how the Commission operated by the logic of proof was 
evidenced in the medical team’s examinations of several tens of individual corpses. They recorded 
on average a paragraph of characterizations for each corpse, noting details such as age, height, 
clothing, estimated nutritional intake, position and size of bullets in the skull, and whether or not 
hair remained on the corpses. 69  The Commission proceeded from micro-documentation to 
illuminating Majdanek’s greater factory-like aspect of ‘death-manufacturing’. Special forensic 
teams investigated the gas chambers and crematoria, noting details on structure and “collections 
of blue color” left on the walls.70 The conclusions the Red Army officers made about the nature of 
Majdanek during their initial investigations were similar to those the Commission made couple of 
weeks later. Witos merged several smaller technical or medical commissions into the greater 
Commission, but many of these members had been involved since the earliest investigations 
simply as qualified specialists – specifically the Polish Professor Szylling-Syngalewicz of the 
Medical University of Lublin. A comparison of some of the early Red Army reports with those of 
the Commission highlight not only the exterminatory characteristic of Majdanek but also the 
systematic nature of killing.  
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On the same day the Soviets entered the camp, army officers composed a report in which 
the corroborating testimony of the Soviet POW, V. P. Petrov, highlighted such characteristics. 
This was an eyewitness testimony that corroborated the tangible material evidence of mass 
extermination found at the site. Yet Petrov’s observation that these murders were ideologically 
and ethnically motivated could not be proven based solely on the evidence visible to the officers. 
Petrov stated:   
“Before the Red Army arrived the Germans burned 1,500 prisoners of war and 
civilians imprisoned in the camp. V. Petrov and others said that this was not the 
only case of such burning. In November 1943 the Germans burned 48,000 people 
among whom the majority were Jews and civilians. The burning was motivated by 
the fact that these people were deemed politically dangerous as they do not 
sympathize with the German order.”71  
This excerpt from a short eleven-sentence preliminary report includes a reference to a mass killing 
and even notes that a large majority of them were Jews. The report points out systematic repetition 
of purposeful killing for ideological reasons. However, as was typical for Soviet reporting on Nazi 
atrocity, there is no reference to the antisemitic nature of Nazi ideology. Communists and Soviet 
POWs, of whom there were many at Majdanek, were imprisoned and killed for being non-
sympathetic to the Germans. But Jews were not imprisoned and killed because of a conscious 
choice to oppose the German order or for their adherence to something the Germans deemed 
ideologically harmful but solely for their ethnicity. One could, in principle, choose not be a 
communist or a soldier – but ethnicity was perceived by the Germans as primordial. It is in this 
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way that the Soviet reports on Nazi atrocity against Jews failed to address the necessarily ethnic – 
i.e., Jewish – component inherent in Nazi ideology and, therefore, its genocidal policy. The 
materials from the Commission’s investigations heavily document the systematic nature of the 
Nazis’ crimes of what has since been interpreted as predetermined genocide of the Jews but do not 
attempt to address antisemitism as the cause. 
 In another Soviet report from the following day on July 26, Majdanek’s specific function 
as an extermination center was pointed out: 
“At the end of 1941 in the outskirts of Lublin at Majdanek construction was begun 
of a concentration camp whose capacity recently reached 25,000 people. It was a 
camp for extermination, no one returned back from it.”72 
Then just a few lines down, the report – which was written by Red Army officers and verified by 
Senior Lieutenant Ippolitov in the Department of Information – explicitly highlights Jewish 
predominance among the victims (although in another report from around the same time he erased 
references to Jews): 
“Prisoners were brought here from various countries of Europe: from France, 
Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Czechoslovakia. These were primarily 
Jews (Eto byli preimuschestvenno, evrei).”73  
The report goes on to describe the basic aspects of the camp, including forced labor, food 
conditions, and the gas chambers and crematorium. It highlights other victims, such as Russian 
POWs, but it points to Jewish specificity in two other instances. One addresses a mass 
extermination of Jews on November 3, 1943. It describes how on that day SS officers played light 
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tango and foxtrot music from morning into the night while they killed “18,000 Jews and Poles” 
both by mass shootings and by sending them to the gas chambers.74 Here the report references 
Jews and Poles, but in a later protokol from August 24th during the Commission’s questionings, 
the SS officer being interrogated only mentions Jews when referring to the same mass 
extermination.75 The Commission’s Chair, Witos, questioned SS-officer Shollen while the Polish 
secretary Piotr Sobolewski recorded the testimony. Shollen was in charge of the warehouse in 
which clothes collected from incoming prisoners were stored. What follows is an excerpt from the 
questioning: 
Q: “How did the Germans treat Russian POWs?” 
A: “With regard to Russians, I do not know exactly, but I know that on November     
3, 1943, from 18-20,000 Jews were destroyed.”     
Q: “From where did all the shoes and also the clothing from women and children 
that were found in the camp come?” 
A: “These things belonged to the murdered, primarily Jews.” 
Q: “What did they do with the corpses?” 
A: “I heard that they burned them in the crematoria.” 
The third and final reference to Jews in the early report from July 26th occurs in the closing 
line – “During the camp’s existence a few hundred thousand people were exterminated, more than 
40,000 of whom were Jews from Lublin and its surrounding regions.” 76  In this instance the 
estimated number of 40,000 Jews refers only to those from the Lublin area and not those from 
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other countries or regions of Poland. However, earlier in the same report it was mentioned that 
most of the people at Majdanek from other countries were, in fact, mostly Jews. Therefore, in the 
report itself it can be determined that the actual number of Jews killed was much higher than 
40,000 and that most of the camp’s victims were Jews.  
From the above reports it was clear that Jews were specifically being targeted for 
extermination. Aside from ethnic specificity, the reports also pointed to the technical and 
systematic nature of extermination. To expand upon what was written about the nature of the camp 
above, in a concluding report by a medical and chemical expert commission on August 18, the 
members determined that “in the Lublin concentration camp at Majdanek, during the entire period 
of its 4-year existence, in accordance with a deeply thought out and logical system, the mass 
extermination of people who were specially brought in to be killed was carried out.”77 This was a 
death camp for “the largest number of people.” On the same day that they established this report, 
many of the same members of the forensic-medical commission independent of the Polish-Soviet 
Commission (which had been working since August 4th) were then subsumed into the new 
forensic-medical commission established by Witos which was headed by the Polish member Dr. 
Ludwik Christians. They began the medical investigation the following day, and the members 
established that “at the fore of the most effective manifestation of German technology and culture 
was the gas used to poison people.” 78  A few days later after reviewing miscellaneous 
documentation on every aspect of the camp from daily nutritional protocols to methods used for 
gassing victims, the members of Commission came to the conclusion that  
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“in Lublin there existed a camp which the Germans themselves called an 
‘extermination camp.’ For the extermination of the largest number of people they 
used various methods. Modes for nutrition, sustenance, work, and torture were also 
used for the mass extermination of the prisoners.”79 
In the few Red Army and Commission reports, it is both apparent that Majdanek functioned 
as an extermination camp in which death was organized on a massive scale under systematic and 
logical means and that its primary victims were Jews. The exterminatory nature of the camp was 
never questioned, and the available documents do not even suggest that the members of the 
Commission disputed the fact that Jews were, indeed, the primary victims. When the Commission 
met on August 24th and 25th to discuss the findings and to decide what should be written in a 
Communique to be published in the Soviet and Polish presses, the debates did not center on 
whether or not Jews actually constituted the largest number among the victims but whether or not 
to report as such.  
*** 
In examining preliminary Soviet army reports and corroborating testimony from the 
Commission’s investigation a few weeks later, it is possible to recognize that, as Arkadi Zeltser 
has argued, “the Jewish topic [was] fully evident.”80 As Zeltser argues further, not only had Soviet 
officers and soldiers begun to acknowledge Jewish victimhood but “more than a few” of them had 
even started “wonder[ing] why exactly the Nazis hated Jews so much.”81 This is apparent in at 
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least one of the questionings of a high-ranking SS officer named Ternes during the Commission’s 
investigation:82 
Q: “What can you say about the number of those killed on 3 Nov 1943?” 
A: “18,000 people.” 
Q: “Why do the Germans carry out mass exterminations of Jews?” 
A: “Because in the program of the National Socialist Party it is said that Jews are a bad   
people and that they all must be destroyed.” 
It would seem that someone listening to or reading Ternes’s response might have perceived that 
there was something particular about Nazi ideology which necessitated the annihilation of the 
Jewish people, but only Sommerstein interpreted it as such. As most of the Commission documents 
explicitly highlighting the prominence of Jews among the victims and their special singling out for 
harsher treatment in all camp matters (such as food rations) were based on the interviews of eye-
witnesses, if perceived from a Soviet approach it is logical that the members would choose to 
disregard those references entirely or manipulate them in order to match a different narrative – 
even if they were many in number.83 Witness testimonies are different in nature from the more 
tangible material-based evidence preferred by the Soviets. That is, eye witness accounts are 
subjective and interpretive, but the Soviets perceived the documentary evidence as indisputable.   
It was also important during this time of flux in the transition to communist rule that Poles 
were not prohibited from mourning Majdanek as their own atrocity. Another wartime Soviet norm 
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was to give tragedy a narrative of victory, but as Hicks writes regarding Majdanek: “Martyrdom 
to ultimate victory [was] no longer plausible.”84 This is why the Soviets allowed a city-wide 
Catholic memorial mass to take place for mourning, why they allowed the local people to come to 
the camp daily, and – most importantly – why they allowed plans for a museum to proceed before 
the Commission had even finished its investigation. 
 Interestingly enough, Majdanek was not closed off to the ordinary citizens during the early 
days of liberation. Photographs and video footage show Poles from the city coming to observe the 
camp. Majdanek was not far from the city, and throughout the German occupation period Lublin’s 
inhabitants were aware that something horrific was happening at the camp on the outskirts of town. 
There were several photographs across the pages of Izvestiia and Pravda in August and September 
of 1944 depicting local Poles mourning their dead at Majdanek or simply observing the camp. 
Incidentally, many of the photos of local Poles visiting the camp were captured by Soviet 
cameramen. David Shneer writes that the decision to depict local Poles at the atrocity site was 
“ambiguous” but ultimately one that “rendere[d] it a non-Jewish place.”85 One gets the sense that 
instead of actively trying to depict Majdanek as a place of greater Polish suffering, the cameramen 
initially simply refrained from inhibiting local Poles from doing it themselves. Yet Shneer’s 
analysis is one of photographs and film – the press reports, including the emotional pieces of Kriger, 
Ehrenburg, and Gorbatov and the more technical reports such as the Commission's Communique, 
do not so strongly depict Polish suffering but follow the typical Soviet pattern of universalization 
of suffering. But the Commission’s overall investigation and debates on how to write the 
Communique tell us more than the actual finished products for the press because they show tension 
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and not simply an uncontested Soviet monopoly on the narrative, as well as the perspective of local 
actors in the new regime rather than journalists whose specific jobs were to report on the war.  
From the outset, Witos emphasized the specific Polish nature of Majdanek. In the end the 
Communique did not reflect his wishes. However, even if in the Soviet press Polish suffering was 
downplayed, the long-term effects as they actually unfolded in eastern Poland were much more 
nuanced. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss those developments, but an analysis of the 
immediate post-liberation situation and procedures at Majdanek shows the setting from which the 
later memory work developed. In the following section it will first be shown how members of the 
Commission – the most important members of whom were also high-standing actors in the PKWN 
– debated the Jewish question and formulated early narratives of suffering at Majdanek for the 
press. A presentation and analysis of the final version of the Communique will follow. It is 
plausible that for the Polish members of the Commission, communist or otherwise, it was more 
important that Jewish specificity be downplayed rather than Polish suffering highlighted in this 
particular moment. But as plans for the museum developed, favoring Poles above other groups, 
including Jews, was a consistent trend. Furthermore, although Poles were not particularly 
highlighted in the Communique and were subsumed into greater “Slavonic” suffering, specific and 
emotive references to Polish suffering were maintained more frequently than those to other groups, 
even Soviet POWs.  
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CHAPTER THREE: FROM PROTOKOL TO PRESS: DEBATING THE COMMUNIQUE ON 
NAZI ATROCITY AT MAJDANEK 
 
This chapter will address two debates at the end of the Commission’s investigation in which 
members discussed how to frame Majdanek for the Communique they were preparing for the press. 
The Communique will receive special attention after the debates have been presented. During these 
debates – referred to as such in the protocols for broader events recorded by Piotr Sobolewski – 
Commission members specifically discussed questions of Jewish victimhood and its representation. 
That Jews were specially targeted by Nazis became most apparent on August 24th after the 
Commission intensely questioned survivors (including Poles and Soviet POWs) and SS officers. 
After finishing the interviews Dr. Kudriavtsev composed a general conclusion based on the results 
which he then presented to the other members. The first and most important debate took place 
shortly thereafter. This was a general debate at the camp that included the discussion of plans for 
the Communique among members of its editing committee, while the second debate was explicitly 
centered on the Communique and took place the following day on August 25th at the Lublin Court 
House. At this meeting, the purpose was to present the pre-confirmed draft for the Communique 
rather than actually discuss it. Sobolewski did not record the debate at the press conference to 
nearly the extent to which he covered the first one. This is because by the time the actual press 
conference occurred, all issues regarding the actual composition of the Communique had been 
decided by Kudriavtsev and Professor Grashchenkov. Having been present the day before, 
Sobolewski knew what was expected and seemingly recorded information more selectively. 
Therefore, the debate at the press conference will receive less attention than the first. 
 Andrzej Witos, Grashchenkov, and Emil Sommerstein conducted most of the interviews 
on August 24th, and film footage and photographs show them sitting together at a table in front of 
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barracks while one of them would individually hold the interview. Therefore, each was aware of 
what was being asked and the answers given, and in the debates Sommerstein and Grashchenkov 
spoke most frequently and most controversially.   
Commission members followed a pattern of actually leaving references to Jewish 
victimhood in their initial documentation (there is no evidence that Sobolewski was ordered to 
remove or doctor references to Jews in the transcripts) and then downplaying it at the next level, 
regardless of whether it was for the preparation of a new ‘verified’ army report or for representation 
in the media. By examining how the Commission debated these issues for their official 
Communique, one can observe similar ‘information transfers’ and show how many distinct but 
inter-connected actors (i.e., Soviets, Polish communists, Polish non-communists, and Polish-
Jewish communists) first determined and then ‘negotiated’ the place of the Jew in what has now 
been interpreted as the Holocaust.  
 Soviet writers such as Vasily Grossman, Boris Gorbatov, and Konstantin Simonov were 
sent to report on Majdanek as a continuation of the broader wartime reporting they had already 
been doing for three years. Rather than analyzing their reporting on Majdanek, it is more 
appropriate to focus on the Communique first published by the Commission on September 16th. 
The Communique allows one to directly observe how questions of victimhood were being formed 
and debated in the context of early Polish-Soviet relations. Those who composed the Communique 
were the actual actors in the new state institutions, rather than reporters or writers. Unfortunately, 
by focusing on the Communique it is only possible to observe how Jews were explicitly erased 
and not how Poles were favored. What follows is an examination of the debates within the 
Commission on how to depict the victims of the atrocities at Majdanek.  
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Debating questions of ethnic specificity and Jewish victimhood 
On August 18th during a meeting to collate evidence collected by the miscellaneous 
commissions and to establish a plan for upcoming Commission work, Dr. Kudriavtsev invited 
those present to visit the Gestapo warehouse at 27 Chopin Street where they could observe an 
“exhibit” – a euphemism for the intact facility – evidencing mass extermination.86 There he called 
those who were members of the press to appeal to the public to bring any evidence relating to the 
crimes and mass extermination at Majdanek to the Commission.87 There were several moments 
such as this one during the investigation when various members of groups independent of one 
another, including journalists, investigated Majdanek and prepared information for the press. Such 
people would have undoubtedly been present on August 25th for the organized press conference at 
the Lublin Court House where general evidence of mass extermination at Majdanek would be 
presented. At 7:00 pm a special block of time was set aside to present and debate the draft of the 
Communique.88 Before addressing this it is necessary to review what transpired the day before 
after Kudriavtsev presented his conclusion of the results of the interviews of prisoners and SS-
officers, as the debate at the press conference was in many ways a continuation of the argument 
between Sommerstein and Grashchenkov at this time.89  
After finishing the interviews and hearing Dr. Kudriavtsev’s conclusion, Sommerstein, 
Grashchenkov, Professor Prozorovskii, Professor Białkowski, and Dr. Kudriavtsev argued over 
how to deal with the fact that those being questioned had several times singled out Jews as 
                                                          
86 Summary of proceedings at the general meeting to integrate miscellaneous commissions into the official Commission, 
recorded by Piotr Sobolewski, protokol no. 1 of the Polish-Soviet Extraordinary Commission at Majdanek, p. 12, Lublin, August 
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87 Ibid. 
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89 It is difficult to determine if this was an actual document prepared by Kudriavtsev or an unofficial speech by him given 
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receiving the harshest treatment and constituting the largest number of victims. It is worth 
mentioning some examples. 
Grashchenkov was made aware that Jews were particularly targeted for their ethnicity (and 
not as intellectuals as he would later argue) when he questioned the senior lieutenant and SS-
Obersturmführer Ternes. To Grashchenkov’s question of why the Germans carry out mass 
exterminations of Jews Ternes replied: “Because in the program of the National Socialist Party it 
is said that Jews are a bad people and that they all must be destroyed.”90 Grashchenkov failed to 
interpret this as indicating the antisemitic component of Nazi ideology. When considering those 
who had been brought from other European countries, he did not distinguish the Jewish from the 
non-Jewish communists, even though the Czech-Austrian prisoner Tomaček, who had been 
arrested as a communist, after describing the horrible camp regime said that “it was always like 
that for us, but Jews bore a more difficult experience than we did.”91  
While mentioning those who had been brought from Greece, Holland, and Czechoslovakia, 
those being questioned specifically noted that they were Jews. For example, the Polish chemist 
Budzyń told Witos that “from Czechoslovakia…Jews arrived in crowds,” while when asked if he 
had seen prisoners from Holland the prisoner Anton Benen – himself a Dutch national – answered 
“yes, they were primarily Jews who they [the Germans] then destroyed.”92  Of course, it is true 
that the Jews were citizens of these other countries. But Jews had long been singled out as “other” 
– especially in Poland and the areas constituting Soviet territory – long before Hitler came to power. 
                                                          
90 Questioning of Senior SS-Obersturmführer Ternes by Professor N. I. Grashchenkov at the general meeting to interview 
former prisoners and SS officers at Majdanek, recorded by Piotr Sobolewski, protokol no. 4 of the Polish-Soviet Extraordinary 
Commission, p. 11, Lublin, August 24, 1944, APMM, z. XXV, j.a. 4, l. 46.  
91 Ibid., p. 9.  
92 Ibid.: Questioning of the Polish chemist Tadeusz Budzyń by Professor Szylling-Syngalewicz and the questioning of the 
Dutch prisoner Anton Benen by Professor Prozorovskii, (pp. 6-7), l. 40-41.    
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But in this instance the Commission found it necessary for Jews to be considered first as citizens 
of the European countries from which they had been deported.  
The Polish chemist Andrzej Stanisławski stated that he had seen “a lot of Russian POWs, 
Poles, and other nationalities” but later stated that “the largest number exterminated were Jews.”93 
The phrase “it was primarily Jews” was scattered all throughout the recorded responses. Earlier on 
August 19th the Commission met to discuss the materials collected thus far by the miscellaneous 
commissions, especially from the medical and technical experts. In the corresponding protocol it 
was written that there were three categories of prisoners – the first was Russian and Polish POWs, 
followed by criminals (which included communists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and homosexuals), and, 
lastly, “those whose only guilt was that they lived, walked, and breathed.”94  In the document it is 
not indicated that these were Jews and Slavs (for at Majdanek there were many non-Jewish Poles, 
Russians, and Belarussians deported under Operation Ost, the Germans’ plan for clearing living 
space in the east). The German prisoner Hans Shtable in his interview in reference to the gas 
chambers said that “first it was Jews, then Russians and others.”95 There are several references to 
non-Jewish Poles and Soviet citizens throughout the testimonies falling victim to the mass 
executions and gassings, as well. However, even though those who were questioned by the 
Commission all indicated that Majdanek was, indeed, an “international camp” (mezhdunarodnyi 
lager’, as frequently emphasized by the Soviets), they often added that there was still specificity, 
such as when Tomaček stated:  
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“I should say that people very often ended up at Majdanek not for internment in the 
camp, but specifically for extermination.”96 
Considering that everyone on the Commission agreed that Majdanek was an extermination 
camp based on the systematic destruction of human beings, if the largest group among the 
ethnicities represented were Jewish (or when classified by nationality it was apparent that the 
majority of said nationals were Jewish) why would Commission members – except for Sommertein 
– fail to interpret the Jewish fate as genocide? This is because these witness accounts do not 
necessarily in and of themselves imply genocidal policy. But the fact that former prisoners 
consistently pointed out Jewish suffering while Grashchenkov and Kudriavtsev preferred to 
downplay it suggests that there was a conscious effort to cover-up these references to Jewish 
suffering. While it is true that knowledge about what has since been interpreted as the Holocaust 
was not very widespread at the time, it should be noted that the Communique did not obscure 
references to specific massacres of Poles or Soviet POWs like they did to those referencing Jews.  
The debate began with some minor considerations which were “important for history,” but 
these were resolved quickly.97  Sommerstein then moved to the issues that he considered more 
‘important for history.’ Tired of constant references to Majdanek as an “international camp,” he 
argued that while several nationalities were represented in the camp, it was only the Jews who 
suffered “indiscriminate extermination.”98 This was precisely why Sommerstein wanted to have a 
                                                          
96 Questioning by the wartime investigator of the Military Prosecutor’s Office of the First Belorussian Front Justice Major 
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special section on Jews in the Communique. At this moment he urged the Commission to recall 
that Budzyń mentioned that most of the international transports were Jews who had carried with 
them German propaganda posters promising a new place to live and work. He told the other 
members that Hitler had ordered all Jews in the occupied countries of Europe to wear special 
“znaki” (symbols – i.e., yellow Stars of David) and asked them to reflect on why such a camp was 
in Lublin and not somewhere in Denmark, reminding them that the royal Danish family had been 
outspoken against Hitler’s antisemitic policies.99  
For Sommerstein, this was clearly genocide, but he knew that others would have trouble 
seeing it that way – and not just the non-Jewish Commission members. The Communique was 
being prepared for an international audience, and he argued that Jewish singularity would not “be 
grasped overseas” if Jewish extermination was not distinguished “from the larger question of the 
mass extermination of representatives of 22 nationalities of Europe.”100 He argued that Majdanek 
was built in Lublin “far away from European societies” so that Hitler could carry out his goal of 
exterminating first all of the Jews of Poland and then those of other European countries.  
Without denying the likelihood of antisemitism among the Commission members, one can 
interpret Sommerstein’s sense of urgency in this debate as stemming from his frustration that he 
knew that he was in a privileged position to acutely gauge that Hitler had enacted a genocide of 
European Jewry while the other Commission members would not as easily interpret it as such.101 
This was because while simultaneously working on the Commission to investigate crimes specific 
to Majdanek, he was dealing with Jews who had been hiding in forests or on farms during the war 
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and meeting with Jewish partisans who had been fighting in the Polish underground. Therefore, 
he was in a position to interpret the wartime fate of the Jews as separate from the greater 
devastation to other peoples. He urged other members of the Committee to see the situation 
similarly and argued for the necessity to highlight the unique fate of Jews and their overwhelming 
predominance among the victims of the camp. Yet, the other members of the Commission were 
not in agreement.  
Grashchenkov quickly voiced opposition to Sommerstein’s suggestion to highlight the 
unique Jewish fate in a special section in the Communique. He stated that it would “hardly [be] 
advisable to jump so scrupulously to such an approach.”102 He preferred to see the victims as 
intellectuals who happened to be Jewish rather than Jews who happened to be intellectuals. He 
stated that the Germans had targeted the intellectuals of all countries and that “Jews underwent 
extermination as the intellectual strength of these countries” and that “in consideration of this, it 
is necessary to cite the number of facts and mass extermination of Jews as citizens of these 
countries [emphasis mine].”103 Yet, they were not exterminated as the intellectual strength of these 
countries but as Jews who happened to constitute much of their intellectual strength. What is most 
significant is that Grashchenkov opposed highlighting Jews but did not deny that they had indeed 
been singled out. Instead, he argued that the international Jewish victims should be framed as 
citizens of those countries and not as Jews. He stated that it would be better to give “one good 
announcement on the mass destruction of the citizens” rather than establishing “a communique of 
special consideration of particular nationalities.”104   
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Professor Prozorovskii, a Soviet member of the Commission, stepped in and reemphasized 
the purpose for the Commission’s work at Majdanek in the first place. He indicated that this would 
be a continuation of the similar sort of trials the Soviets had done at Khar’kov and, therefore, 
agreed with Grashchenkov that the focus should be on proving the Germans’ guilt without 
highlighting special cases of suffering.105 The historian Alexander Prusin writes that the Khar’kov 
trial in 1943, as the first Soviet war crimes tribunal, marked a turn by which the Soviets would try 
to prove the guilt of the entire German nation for political means – specifically for showing that 
Nazism was a threat to “the entire ‘Soviet people’ without ethnic distinction,” extremely 
downplaying Jewish suffering when necessary.106 He writes that at the Khar’kov trial witnesses 
were used for the sole purpose of describing the German crimes. The Commission’s investigation 
of Majdanek followed this pattern because the camp was legally under Red Army control, and 
while the PKWN was not a Soviet puppet, many Soviet hands did control its strings.  
After a period in which Sommerstein continued to implore the other members to see the 
necessity of highlighting specific Jewish victimhood, Dr. Kudriavtsev interjected and affirmed that 
“under no circumstance can the question of mass exterminations of a people be separated from the 
general Majdanek tragedy,” calling upon his own authority as vice-president of the Commission 
to settle the question once and for all. He immediately followed this with – “Majdanek is an 
international camp of death that was a prison for all nationalities of Europe.”107   
Dr. Kudriavtsev went on to argue that “neither do we highlight the question of the mass 
extermination of Soviet POWS, we say only that a large number of Soviet citizens were killed at 
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Majdanek.” 108  Yet this claim was not reflected in the Communique itself. Perceiving 
Sommerstein’s despair, Dr. Kudriavtsev paused and specifically addressed his stance. He said that 
while he understood Sommerstein’s position “as a representative of his people” who “especially 
points out the extermination of the Jews of Poland and Europe” it was necessary to show evidence 
of the murder of all nationalities – “no mne kazhetsia, chto my dolzhny govorit’ o vsekh 
narodnostiakh (It seems to me that we should speak of all nationalities).” 109 Yet in the context of 
the debate, one hears rather “It seems to me that we should not speak of Jews.” Thus it was decided 
to refrain from highlighting any ethnic specificity. Grashchenkov called for a meeting the 
following day to actually compose the text of the Communique which was to be based solely on 
facts proving the German atrocities.  
Sommerstein had tried to convince the Soviet members to favor highlighting the Jews by 
framing the Germans’ indiscriminate murder of them as a threat to the safety of Bolshevism in 
Europe.110 But Sommerstein was a reluctant communist, and this was likely not his own personal 
logic for needing a special section on Jews in the Communique but rather a way to convince the 
Soviet members to approve it. However, after Grashchenkov initially expressed opposition, other 
Soviet members Professors Prozorovskii and Kudriavtsev also voiced their agreement that specific 
references to Jewish suffering be avoided. If Professor Białkowski voiced any support for 
Sommerstein or argued that references to Poles be highlighted, such assertions were not recorded.  
The next day on August 25th, Andrzej Witos opened the press conference at the Lublin 
Court House with the announcement that the work of the Polish-Soviet Commission to Investigate 
Crimes at Majdanek had come to an end. He said that it was necessary to review the text of the 
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Communique so that this document would have a historical significance. Considering that “soon 
the whole world [would] know about the crimes at Majdanek,” he reemphasized the need to simply 
present evidence quickly.111 One perceives that Witos was speaking to the Soviet members’ wishes 
that specifically a communist state would first reveal evidence of this unprecedented Nazi 
extermination camp to the world.  There was a strong sense of appealing to the post-war order in 
his speech. That is, he said that “perhaps many politicians and diplomats, having learned of the 
truth of German crimes at Majdanek, will not repeat the same mistakes for which millions of 
innocent people brutally paid with their blood.” 112  Here the implication was that the new 
communist world order would restore peace, and it seems that Witos was implicitly directing these 
comments towards the Allies.  
 Afterwards Grashchenkov read the project for the text of the Communique and presented 
a working draft. Importantly, he asked those in attendance to pay attention not only to the internal 
content but to the form of the Communique itself.113 This is significant because it illustrates the 
importance of framing in the context of reporting wartime atrocity, a practice which was especially 
important for Majdanek. Sobolewski then indicated that Grashchenkov formed the text on the 
premises of what had been gathered by the special editing commission during the debate that had 
taken place the previous day. This means that one of the most important goals was to recast 
references to Jewish suffering in terms of universal victimhood. This was a conscious choice, 
although whether or not it was an inherently antisemitic one will be addressed later.  
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After Grashchenkov read the text, a “lively” (ozhivlennye) debate (likely a euphemism for 
‘heated’) occurred. 114  And yet, Sobolewski recorded none of the actual content but instead 
proceeded directly to state that Sommerstein agreed to Grashchenkov’s text. A more nuanced 
reading of the document suggests that during this press conference on August 25th those present 
engaged directly with Sommerstein. Not only that, but there were likely specific references to 
discussions on Polish representation which were also left out. Both cases would provide 
unfavorable documentation attesting to tensions. So many details were preserved in the documents 
regarding the first debate because it was spontaneous, while the debate at the press conference, on 
the other hand, occurred as part of a pre-organized event for the public. Therefore, debate was 
likely more regulated, and, as previously mentioned, Sobolewski was probably practicing a form 
of self-censorship.  
Although unsuccessful in convincing Grashchenkov to create a special section for Jews in 
the Communique, Sommerstein eventually conceded that Grashchenkov’s text “accommodates 
everything that needs to be said about the concentration camp at Majdanek and what was found 
through the investigation.”115 That he considered the text of the Communique as accommodating 
all that should be said about Majdanek is simply not true. Sommerstein’s main duty within the 
PKWN was to secure war reparations and to repatriate Polish citizens, but his most immediate 
concern was over those Polish Jews who had fled to the Soviet Union at the beginning of the war 
and who might now return. Yet at a broader level he was most worried about the fate of the Jews 
in Poland and elsewhere, knowing that they were being killed indiscriminately. He was appealing 
to Stalin and confiding in Yitzak Zuckerman that he was depressed and that he was alienated in 
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Lublin. That he was at extreme odds with Grashchenkov and the other Polish members contributed 
to his depression and feelings of alienation. Sommerstein may have eventually agreed to 
Grashchenkov’s text because he thought it would perhaps facilitate a smoother transition for Jews 
returning to Lublin and the newly liberated territories and that it would be easier for him to procure 
Soviet assistance for reparations if he appeared to be cooperative. Highlighting Jews in the press 
could have also further antagonized local Poles who were already opposed to Soviet rule. A final 
consideration for why Sommerstein ultimately approved of Grashchenkov’s text is that perhaps he 
may have eventually actually considered it better that Nazi atrocities against Jews were framed as 
universal.116 Sommerstein was in a unique position in which he was able to see that Jewish life in 
Poland and Eastern Europe had been nearly completely destroyed but that the war had not 
eradicated antisemitism by any means. Therefore, he had a real incentive to see a successful 
implementation of communist rule in Poland. This was before the infamous post-war Polish 
pogroms against Jews when it was still conceivable that Jewish life might be revived. 
Sommerstein’s main goal, after all, was to repatriate thousands of Jews back to Poland. 
Highlighting Jews, after all, would likely have antagonized the local Poles who resisted communist 
rule. Continuing to insist upon it might have antagonized the non-Jewish Polish communists in the 
PKWN. Sommerstein perhaps foresaw that persisting on the issue might have unpleasant 
ramifications for Jews in the complicated triangle of Soviet-Jewish-Polish relations in newly 
liberated Poland.  
Yet, this does not mean that Sommerstein still did not try to insert more nuanced references 
to Jews in the Communique. Apparently he had only “two personal modifications” for inclusion 
                                                          
116 For why the assimilated Polish and Soviet filmmakers at Majdanek “de-Judaized” the camp in the context of Jews perhaps 
wanting to do so and for a discussion of how Jews, having the most invested in the communist project, would have preferred to see 
themselves primarily Soviet citizens and would have, therefore, themselves perhaps wanted to subsume Jewish suffering into more 
universal frameworks see Shneer, Through Soviet-Jewish Eyes, p. 169. 
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in Grashchenkov’s text. The first was to note that the Germans also sent bodies to the crematorium 
that were still half-alive. Secondly, he wanted to emphasize that the Germans received financial 
revenue from the personal property belonging to those they killed. Here he was explicitly 
referencing a group of Czech Jews who upon their arrival at Majdanek in luxury train cars were 
stripped of their property, interned, and gassed shortly afterwards. He wanted to emphasize the 
widely practiced “German propaganda trick” by which German authorities would post signs 
claiming that Jews were being relocated for work and that they should board luxury passenger 
trains with their finest belongings.117 Under questioning by Witos, the Polish chemist from Lublin 
named Budzyń – who was referenced several times in the Communique – pointed out that many 
of these Jews had carried with them German propaganda posters promising a new place for them 
to live and work. First of all, as it was known that the Germans were distributing such propaganda 
posters to Jews both in Germany and in the countries they occupied, Sommerstein likely 
considered that even if the reference to Jews on this matter was removed in the Communique – 
which it was – that Jews abroad might be able to read between the lines and decipher that the 
Dutch, French, Czech, Slovak, German and other nationals listed as being deported to Majdanek 
were actually mostly Jewish representatives of those nationalities. Secondly, by particularly 
wanting to include references to war crimes with a financial aspect, Sommerstein considered that 
perhaps it would speedily facilitate funds for war reparations, particularly for the Jews in Lublin 
and eastern Poland returning from hiding or fighting in the forests or countryside who were in dire 
need of the most basic necessities.118 Although special funds for Jewish relief would likely stoke 
                                                          
117 Minutes on Emil Sommerstein’s input for Grashchenkov’s draft of the Communique, recorded by Piotr Sobolewski, 
protokol no. 6 of the Polish-Soviet Commission at Majdanek, p. 1, Lublin, August 25, 1944, APMM, z. XXV, j.a. 4, l. 54. 
118 “Restoration of Looted Property, Full Rights, Promised Polish Jews by New Committee,” JTA, July 24, 1944 (July 25, 
London), http://www.jta.org/1944/07/25/archive/restoration-of-looted-property-full-rights-promised-polish-jews-by-new-
committee (accessed April 8, 2015); “Jewish Relief Committee Organized in Liberated Poland: Hopes for Aid from America,” 
JTA, September 6, 1944 (Lublin, September 5), http://www.jta.org/1944/09/06/archive/jewish-relief-committee-organized-in-
liberated-poland-hopes-for-aid-from-america (accessed April 8, 2015); “International Conference of Federations of Polish Jews 
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envy among the locals against Jews, Sommerstein reasoned that if people knew that Jews suffered 
particularly harshly under Hitler’s policies then they would be sympathetic and desire to help them. 
It is now known that the war did not instill local sympathy for the Jews but instead exacerbated 
tensions. Yet at the time Sommerstein did not perceive that attitudes would remain so harsh.  
The debate on August 25th ended with Andrzej Witos approving Grashchenkov’s plan for 
the Communique after which he told the committee to have a final version ready no later than 
August 30th. For the Soviet and Polish members besides Sommerstein, the primary objective was 
to collect detailed evidence that simply proved the crimes. It was their goal to then use evidence 
against the Germans in post-war trials and at the peace conference. The crimes would then be 
interpreted as universally affecting all nationalities interned or killed at Majdanek. But the specific 
suffering of Polish people would be emphasized when the circumstance allowed.119   
At the same time, albeit for different reasons, the Allies in the West likewise did not 
perceive Sommerstein’s pleas for assistance to Jews and recognition of their devastation as 
seriously as they might have. Jeremy Hicks writes that the west had a long wartime tradition of 
equating Soviet atrocity reports in the east with propaganda.120 Although Sommerstein had been 
appealing to the Allies (primarily to those in London, where the Polish Government-in-Exile 
                                                          
Called,” JTA, August 14, 1944, http://www.jta.org/1944/08/14/archive/international-conference-of-federations-of-polish-jews-
called (accessed April 8, 2015); “Jewish Organization in America and Canada Plan to Send Delegations to Poland,” JTA, September 
10, 1944, (September , New York), http://www.jta.org/1944/09/10/archive/jewish-organization-in-america-and-canada-plan-to-
send-delegations-to-poland (accessed April 8, 2015); Emil Sommerstein’s conversations with Yitzhak Zuckerman in Lublin on the 
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remained) for help and recognition of the Jewish fate, it was only at the end of October that the 
US Ambassador to Russia Averill Harriman issued a statement affirming that the “German 
atrocities on the Eastern Front, particularly the killing of large masses of Jews, are not and cannot 
be exaggerated.”121  
 
*** 
It is odd that in both debates no other Poles are recorded as expressing disagreement with 
the Soviet members or arguing for highlighting broader Polish suffering in the Communique – 
especially Witos. In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev wrote that he always knew that Witos was 
an “insincere” communist and that he had been able to particularly confirm this when he was 
meeting with him in Lublin in late summer 1944.122 One can assume in his role as Chairman of 
the Commission he may have frequently clashed with the Soviet members. However, there is no 
documentation in the Commission proceedings of debate comparable to that which exists between 
Sommerstein and Grashchenkov, perhaps because it would have been politically incorrect for 
Sobolewski to have recorded conversations highlighting troubled relations between the Polish and 
Soviet members during this time. The Soviets had much more at stake with ethnic Poles than with 
Jews. But considering Witos’s character and position and the fact that he had emphasized the 
particular suffering of the Polish people when the Commission commenced, it is odd that there is 
nothing indicating he contested Grashchenkov’s plan for the Communique. Yet even though he 
was the President of the Commission, it seems that his role was largely symbolic and that his duties 
were more organizational in nature. For example, in his memoirs he said that a lot was already 
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written about Majdanek and that he could add very little, but the little he did mention about his 
duties as Chair concerned disagreements over whether to allow the public to purchase the 
belongings of victims found in the smaller Nazi warehouse at 17 Chopin Street – that is, enact 
measures that would facilitate plunder – in order to appraise how much the Nazis themselves had 
plundered.123 He appealed to the Court, but the rest of the Commission failed to take the matter 
further. He then stated that he took no further interest in this matter, but one can gauge that he 
showed less interest in other matters related to the Commission’s work, as well. This was because 
he was preoccupied preparing his own project for land reform which he presented on September 
5th.124 Therefore, as Witos’s responsibility within the PKWN was to negotiate land reform, it seems 
that he conceded special Polish considerations for the Commission and Communique in exchange 
for an easier time negotiating what he perceived as more pressing matters of agricultural reform. 
Khrushchev indicated that Poles were vehemently opposed to collectivization and that agricultural 
reform was a serious topic in Lublin while he was there in late summer of 1944. Witos was 
eventually dismissed from his position as Head of the Department of Agriculture by October “on 
the grounds that he was sabotaging land reform,”125 and it is worth noting that the collectivization 
of agriculture never happened in Poland.  
Furthermore, it was also in ethnic Poles’ interests to downplay Jewish suffering at 
Majdanek. Therefore, although displeased that Poles were not highlighted, it possibly sufficed for 
Witos that at least Jews were not emphasized, either, even though it was apparent that they were 
Majdanek’s primary victims. However, it is also plausible that his objections were simply not 
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recorded. It also does not seem plausible that the other seven Polish members had nothing to say, 
especially as they had initiated the Commission in the first place. Yet although the Commission 
did not overtly emphasize Polish suffering, it was not obscured like that of Jewish victimhood. In 
fact, a number of emotive references to Polish loss were retained from the interviews in the text 
while others were omitted. 
Even if the Commission operated by the “logic of proof,” its members still understood the 
significance of commentary, and this is why they argued so heatedly over how to compose the 
Communique. Even though reports were appearing in the Soviet press before the Commission 
finished its investigation, the Commission’s report would serve as a more official account, and the 
investigation was conducted with the express purpose of using the materials for post-war legal 
trials. In the previous section it was shown how the Commission conducted its investigation under 
“the logic of proof.” The ultimate goal was to prove the Germans’ guilt and show how they 
committed their crimes, a point Grashchenkov, Witos, and Sommerstein all reiterated. The 
Commission knew that it could not present a Communique completely void of the more emotive 
perspectives eyewitness testimonies provide, as Majdanek represented too much of a 
psychological and conceptual break. Yet recognizing the subjectivity of eyewitness testimony, the 
Commission chose to rely only on those which were consistent with their own interpretation. 
Therefore, the Commission could include a reference to Polish suffering from a witness but justify 
consciously discarding that same witness’s reference to Jewish suffering because it departed from 
the pattern of ‘present, prove, and condemn.’  
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The Communique in the press  
The Communique on Majdanek is similar to previous Soviet wartime reports on the 
Holocaust in that it focuses on proving German crimes through tangible documentation. They are 
similar to those of Krasnodar or Khar’kov trials, for example, in which Soviet writers such as 
Aleksei Tolstoi and Ilya Ehrenburg “laid bare the industrial and racial character of Nazi 
extermination.” 126  Soviet representations from 1943 onward of what is now known as the 
Holocaust increasingly reflected this aspect of Nazi killing – just not that Jews were the primary 
victims. Comparing the proceedings of the Polish-Soviet Extraordinary Commission at Majdanek 
with their Communique helps illuminate the process by which Jews were not interpreted as the 
primary victims of Nazi Genocide. The goal of the Commission was ultimately to produce a 
Communique that “in concordance with what was given in all of the collected research materials” 
would serve as a “condemnation of the guilt of German fascism.”127 Members were expected to 
lay out in the press “all material…indicating the evil of the Germans at Majdanek.”128 That is, the 
Commission was to prove Germany’s guilt by using uncontestable documentary evidence while 
focusing less attention on the victims themselves.  
The Communique was published in Pravda in the Soviet press on September 16th and in 
the Polish newspaper Nowe Życie on September 20th.129 It contained a general opening statement 
followed by seven separate sections on all aspects of the camp, including its exterminatory nature, 
the categories of prisoners, tortures and reprisals, whole-sale shooting, asphyxiation by gas, 
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attempts to erase evidence of mass murder, and the robbery of victims’ possessions. The structure 
of the Communique consisted of essentially verbatim presentations of the conclusions made in the 
reports by the Commission members and the secondary commissions, such as the Medical-
Forensic Commission headed by Professor Szylling-Syngalewicz, during the actual investigation 
interwoven with references to eyewitness accounts from the interviews of former prisoners and 
SS-officers conducted on August 24th. The Communique was not a platform for sharing wartime 
experience in the camp, but rather these eyewitness accounts were used only to corroborate the 
material evidence presented. 
The Commission needed the eyewitness accounts because they elucidated that the hundreds 
of cans of Cyclone-B found at Majdanek had been used to gas human beings and the crematoria 
to burn their corpses.130 This break is evident in the opening of the Communique in which it was 
written: 
“The facts discovered by the Commission in its investigation of the crimes 
committed by the Germans in Lublin far exceed in brutality and barbarity the 
monstrous crimes committed by the German fascist invaders of which international 
public opinion is already aware.”131 
Here Grashchenkov makes clear that Majdanek was unprecedented.132 Importantly for the Soviet 
Union and the PKWN, this information would be revealed for the first time by a communist 
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government. This would lend communism moral authority in the post-war order – an explicitly 
stated goal of the Commission – but would also ensure Soviet credibility among the Allies.  
Both the western and Soviet publics were already aware of German atrocity. But until this 
point they were unaware that there were camps all over in Poland in which “the criminal Hitler 
government organized the massacre of whole sections of the population whom they regarded as 
undesirable, primarily the intellectuals of the occupied countries of Europe, Soviet and Polish 
prisoners of war, and Jews” and that at Majdanek “[t]he prisoners were systematically 
exterminated and fresh transports of prisoners arrived to take their place.”133  In defining the 
categories of prisoners at Majdanek, it was written that this whole-sale extermination of peoples 
was “established by” passports and other documents of the victims belonging to citizens of 
different countries of occupied Europe, the register of deaths which the Germans kept, and the 
evidence presented by a number of witnesses. They then used these three forms to interpret that 
“[t]hus, the camp was a place for the wholesale extermination of different nationalities of 
Europe.”134 Yet this same eye-witness evidence would not be used to indicate that Majdanek was 
an overwhelmingly Jewish camp. Adding “and Jews” to the end of the list of those targeted gives 
recognition to Jewish death, yet preceding this with a reference to “the intellectuals of the occupied 
countries of Europe” or a long list of other nationalities clouds the fact that these were often 
separate categories for the same people. Yet it is worth mentioning, as David Shneer writes, that 
Majdanek was “by far the least Jewish of any extermination camp.” 135  Even in light of 
Sommerstein’s evidence and argumentation, it was perhaps too early to fully apprehend that a 
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genocide of the Jewish people had occurred at Majdanek. Yet this does not mean that the 
Commission did not perceive that Jews were the most prominent among the victims.  
Jewish victims were actually mentioned several times in the Communique. For example, it 
was written that the list of dead was “constantly augmented by… the names of Jews brought from 
the Ghettos set up the by Gestapo in Poland and different towns in Western Europe” and that 
Majdanek and other extermination camps “were also places for the complete extermination of the 
Jewish population.”136 Towards the end of the Communique it was written that the camp contained 
“a vast number of Jews.”137 So one cannot argue that Jewish suffering was ignored. Yet to this it 
is appropriate to consider the following excerpt:  
“Thus, the evidence of numerous eyewitnesses, the findings of the Committee of 
Medical Experts and the Committee of Technical and Chemical Experts prove that 
for nearly three years the Hitler butchers in the Majdanek Camp systematically 
carried out the wholesale asphyxiation with the aid of gases of hundreds of 
thousands of totally innocent people, including aged people, women and 
children.”138 
Here it is seen that the Commission did, indeed, heavily rely on eye-witness testimony. They even 
relied on it to attest to the fact that Jews were among those killed at Majdanek. Yet when citing 
specific examples of atrocity in the Communique based on the eye-witness interviews, the 
Commission kept the references to Russian/Soviet POWs and Poles but changed Jews to “persons.”  
 For example, in the Communique it was written that “On November 3, 1943, eighteen 
thousand four hundred persons were shot in the camp” and that “Stanisławski, a Polish prisoner 
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who worked in the camp office, stated the following concerning the shooting on November 3, 
1943: … ‘[there was] a special extermination of eighteen thousand persons.’”139 Yet this is not 
what Stanisławski said. In the actual testimony, when asked “what can you say about 3 November 
1943” he replied, “I saw a special cordon around Majdanek, surrounded by SS-men and gendearms. 
These brigades shot Jews in the fifth field… the file counted around 20,000.”140 The Commission 
actually received the answer of 18,000 people from Grashchenkov’s interview of SS- 
Obersturmführer Ternes (whose testimony was presented in the previous section) who answered 
Grashchenkov’s query as to why Jews were particularly targeted by the Nazis by stating that 
Jewish destruction was called for in the program of the Nazi party. At that point, Grashchenkov 
had been made aware several times that this particular shooting was of Jews.141 Yet he preserved 
group particularity in other specific occurrences of atrocity. The Communique maintained the 
reference to a group of 5,000 Russian POWs who were shot in winter 1942.142  
 In another example, the Communique mentioned that “[t]he material proof which the 
Commission discovered in the camp – the store of boots and shoes which had belonged to those 
who were shot or who died, the store of miscellaneous belongings of the prisoners, and also the 
Gestapo store in Chopin Street in Lublin – indicates that all the clothing and other belongings of 
the prisoners were carefully sorted and shipped to Germany” and that these belonged to “Soviet 
citizens, Poles, Frenchmen, Czechs, Belgians, Netherlanders, Greeks, Croatians, Italians, 
Norwegians, Danes and also Jews from different countries.”143 Yet such phrasing equalizes what 
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were actually disparate proportions of property belonging to Jews and non-Jews. This was made 
evident by the testimony of SS-officer Shollen who was the clothing manager of the warehouse at 
27 Chopin Street. Witos asked him specifically “from where did all the shoes, and also the clothing 
from women and children, that were found in the camp come?” to which Shollen replied, “These 
things belonged to the murdered, primarily Jews.”144 He then attested that the corpses were then 
burned in the crematoria.  
 Another example shows how a group of incoming Jews were framed as intellectuals. As 
mentioned earlier, Sommerstein had wanted to highlight Budzyń’s testimony about the group of 
1,200 Jews from Athens. In the Communique, the Commission relied upon Budzyń’s testimony to 
illustrate other means of death at Majdanek. Yet they spoke only of “a large group of professors, 
physicians, engineers and other specialists, numbering one thousand two hundred in all, who came 
from Greece” whom the Germans beat to death or worked to exhaustion through humiliating 
means. 145  Even though Sommerstein was unsuccessful in inserting the specifically Jewish 
reference in the Communique, he submitted the information to a Jewish international press in 
which it was stated “[t]he mystery surrounding the fate of several thousand Jews deported from 
Athens by the Germans last year has been partially solved with the disclosure here that 1,200 of 
the deportees were executed at the Majdanek camp… The 1,200 Greek Jews were not gassed, 
burned or buried alive, as were most of the Majdanek victim[s]. Survivors report that they were 
systematically beaten to death over a period of several weeks.”146 
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 Budzyń, Shollen, Stanisławski, and Ternes all attested at times to the particular suffering 
of Poles and/or Soviet or Russian POWs. 147  In the Communique these references were not 
obscured as were their references to Jewish suffering. The Commission also relied on the testimony 
of eye-witness civilians who lived close to the Krembecki woods on the outskirts of Lublin. 
Although Jewish suffering was not erased, Poles were given more emotive descriptions. For 
example, it was written that “Heinz [Hans] Stalbe stated that he saw the chief of the crematorium, 
Oberscharführer Munsfeld, tie a Polish woman hand and foot and throw her alive into the 
furnace.”148 It also stated that a resident from the outskirt of Dziesiąta said that “[f]rom March to 
July 22 the Gestapo brought up a large number of Polish inhabitants… [who] were taken to the 
crematorium.” This was followed by remarks from “Niedzialek, who witnessed these wholesale 
shootings of Polish inhabitants.” Then it was mentioned how SS men brought a trucks “all loaded 
exclusively with [the bodies of] Polish children [which] were entirely naked. All the bodies of 
these children were piled up in stacks in the woods and burnt.”149  
 The Communique relied extensively on the testimony of Stanisławski. There was an 
important moment when in reply to the question “What can you determine about the number of 
prisoners killed?” he answered that “[t]he largest number exterminated were Jews.” 150  That 
Majdanek was a place of predominately Jewish suffering is not perceivable from the Communique 
even though it was referred to as such in several initial Red Army spravki the Commission used in 
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the beginning of the investigation and throughout the questionings of eye witnesses which its 
members had conducted on their own. Instead, Majdanek was presented as a place where the 
Germans could “exterminate the progressive and active part of the Slavonic peoples... [in] enslaved 
Poland” where sometimes “the complete extermination of the Jewish population” took place.151 
*** 
Ultimately, during this time of flux in the immediate period of liberation of Poland, 
Grashchenkov, Witos, and Sommerstein represented the triangle of Soviet, Polish, and Jewish 
interests being carefully negotiated during this time, with the hierarchy of priorities in that order. 
Photographs and select textual commentary showed that the Soviets sometimes were compelled to 
concede some of their wartime norms for reporting German atrocity to accommodate Polish desires 
for Majdanek to be seen as a tragedy for “enslaved Poland.” In the Communique, these concessions 
were minimal compared to those given to Poles actually at home in Lublin. The Communique was 
essentially a Soviet text with a [facile and legitimizing] Polish signature. As it was being prepared 
for an international – especially Soviet – audience, it is not surprising that Jewish suffering was 
downplayed or that Polish suffering was not overwhelmingly highlighted. But by focusing on the 
Communique and the debate over how to structure the Communique instead of other reports on 
Majdanek, valuable insight is gained into how the Jewish question was being negotiated among 
those who would be the actors in a new Poland that was undergoing a transition to communist rule 
at a time when it was still uncertain whether that transition would actually succeed.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
There were several moments during the investigation in which Soviet members of the Commission 
were explicitly made aware of the predominately Jewish number of victims at Majdanek in their 
questionings (in the protokoly) of the remaining prisoners and SS officers who had not been 
included in the final transports to the camps in the west. Jewish specificity is also indicated in 
various spravki (inquiries) and akty (reports). The Jewish ethnic distinction among victims noted 
in such documents was not always transferred to the Soviet press reports, but it also was not 
completely omitted – an already well-known assessment. Of particular significance to this study 
is how this related to early post-war Soviet interactions with the peoples and governments under 
its occupation. It can be assumed for the time being that Soviet representations of the Jewish fate 
during WWII and what is now referred to as the Holocaust were nearly always the result of 
individual debates under various singular circumstances in an atmosphere of shifting Soviet 
prerogatives and wartime policy goals. This study presents itself as one such case.  
As Jeremy Hicks, David Shneer, and Karel Berkhoff have shown, the Soviet central press 
was saturated with reports and photographs – emotive and documentary – of Majdanek. Their work 
tends to center primarily on analyses of films, photos, and reports after they have already been 
made public, reviewing their aesthetic and ideological qualities. They have made excellent points 
for why the Soviets chose to represent Majdanek the way they did. Yet, an argument they do not 
raise is that Majdanek would not have been represented nearly to the extent it was if it had been 
discovered in Belarus or Latvia, for example – territories that were already fully annexed into the 
Soviet Union. Neither would it have been depicted so frequently and with such care if it had been 
found in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, for example – territories that eventually came under Soviet 
influence much later but that did not have such a cohesive ethnic and national front – with an army 
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large enough to legitimately contest the Soviets.152 Even if Poles were divided between the London 
and Lublin governments, there was still a strong national component, largely based on religion, 
which served as a barrier to a smooth communist transition. Some of the leading Polish figures in 
the PKWN were reluctant communists. Of these members, the focus here has been on Andrzej 
Witos and Emil Sommerstein because they represented the two opposing sides from a Polish 
perspective – i.e., ethnic Poles and Jews – but they also represented two competing yet intertwined 
factions that were problematic from a Soviet perspective. Professor N. I. Grashchenkov – himself 
a national minority as a Belarussian – represented the intermediary figure who, on the one hand, 
essentially had the highest authority on the Commission but, on the other, had to negotiate with 
both Sommerstein and Witos and could not actually proceed with his plan for the Communique 
without the latter’s approval. This thesis has been largely a story of how the Jewish aspect was 
negotiated in framing Majdanek for the press. But through that, I have tried to show how it was a 
part of broader flux in early Polish-Soviet relations in which the position on Jews was still being 
formed. 
As Karel Berkhoff has written, the larger Soviet body of the Extraordinary State 
Commission to Investigate Crimes (institutionally separate from the Commission at Majdanek) 
throughout the war did not even publish all of the reports they created because the ultimate goal 
was not to expose crimes, necessarily, but to “legitimize the documentary materials collected in 
order to later use them for the ideological and political struggle of postwar Europe.”153 However, 
many of the same patterns for Red Army reporting applied to the Majdanek Commission. Other 
than the Commission’s own reports, documents procured and created by the Red Army constituted 
                                                          
152 Ramet, Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, p. 21. See also Prusin, The Lands Between, 209-
210.   
153 Berkhoff, Motherland in Danger, p. 121.  
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the bulk of their evidence. For the Poles it was important that a Commission be established to 
investigate Majdanek – it was, after all, at their initiation. Making a great and visible effort to focus 
on the camp – regardless of how questions of either Jewish or Polish specificity were dealt with – 
would lend the Soviets and communist rule in Poland credibility. This idea in itself – that victory 
over Nazism would legitimate Soviet rule over its occupied territories – is not novel. However, 
Jeffrey Burds has shone new insight on early Cold War developments that are relevant to this study. 
He writes that “recently discovered information reveals that Soviet intelligence had intercepted 
and captured German reports regarding British support of anti-Soviet partisans in Poland and 
Ukraine” in 1944 and in western Ukraine from mid-1943.154 But he also writes that the higher 
authorities in Moscow dismissed such reports, including one in which a senior NKVD officer said 
that “within the OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists], there developed a sense that 
England and America were most interested not in a Soviet victory over Germany, but rather in the 
combined weakening of both nations.”155  
Burds goes on to describe that while elites might have rejected such claims, “minorities 
could feed off of misinformation” and that in the borderlands, these “rumors or not” posed a serious 
threat to Soviet control.156 In the Lublin region during this unique window of flux the Polish 
underground army was still actively fighting the Soviets. The Soviets had set up an NKVD camp 
in one of Majdanek’s fields in which captured soldiers from the AK were placed, reflecting this 
concern. By focusing on proving German guilt at Majdanek, the Soviets and members of the 
PKWN could be seen as a moral authority cooperating with the Allies. In this thesis it has been 
shown how the main goal of the Commission was to prepare materials to be used in post-war trials 
                                                          
154 Jeffrey Burds, “The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948,” The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East 
European Studies, no. 1505 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg, 2001), pp. 19, 22.  
155 Ibid., p. 23.  
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that would legally prove German guilt. The documents also indicated that the Commission 
members felt they were doing something that the Western Allies were not – recognizing the 
specific threat of Nazism to Slavic peoples. Questions of ethnic specificity came up only as 
secondary – albeit important – issues. This shows an important perspective on how local actors 
were negotiating the Jewish question in a newly forming government. But the goal was to 
immediately and unquestionably prove that the Germans had committed heinous crimes at 
Majdanek. Highlighting Majdanek would appeal to the West and quickly legitimize Soviet rule 
during this immediate period of flux. Establishing this legitimacy might prove more difficult later 
(when the West and Soviet Union were no longer likely to be “allies”), so it was important to 
secure a communist transition and suppress nationalist resistance first.  
The quote from Berkhoff mentioned above is particularly illuminating in this light, but 
where he sees the downplaying of Jewish suffering and focus on the need to “legitimize the 
documentary materials” in the main context of a revival of Soviet antisemitism (which was 
certainly developing), in the case of Majdanek it seems that the Soviet members of the Commission 
acted more out of a need to negotiate domestic antisemitism in the Polish and Ukrainian territories 
rather than simply exercising their own antisemitic feelings. This is not meant to be an exercise in 
proving competing antisemtism but rather to show that antisemitic results are not always the fruit 
of antisemitic intent.  
If the trend after 1943, as Karel Berkhoff has argued, was to actually refer more often to 
Jewish victims as such at atrocity sites outside of the Soviet Union, it is odd that this was not the 
case at Majdanek, especially as unique Jewish suffering was so many times made explicitly aware 
to everyone on the Committee. But just like at home in the Soviet Union, in Poland it would have 
been equally disruptive for the war effort if the Poles thought of it as a “war for the Jews” or of 
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the Soviets as liberators “of Jews.” Ultimately, focusing on Majdanek – and highlighting Polish 
suffering when possible – would discourage nationalist resistance in both the Soviet west and 
Polish east.  
It is worth reemphasizing Shneer’s observation that Majdanek was “by far the least Jewish 
of any extermination camp,” which was true.157 Yet, the Commission explicitly de-emphasized its 
overwhelming Jewish nature. This was so easily facilitated because only the eye-witness 
testimonies explicitly indicated Jewish specificity in the Commission’s investigation. While an 
extensive photographic record was published so that the world would see (in order to believe) the 
crimes at Majdanek, it was for simply proving German guilt.158 Although the stated goal was to 
emphasize the camp’s international character, in the Communique the Commission also referenced 
eye-witnesses several times to denote specific crimes against Poles or Russian and Soviet 
POWs. 159  Yet when those same individuals attested to specifically Jewish victims, the 
Commission changed the reference from “Jews” to “persons.”160   The Commission aimed to 
universalize all suffering – but the suffering of some groups was more universalized than others. 
Amir Weiner has shown that the NKVD in Ukraine meticulously documented anti-Jewish 
massacres and punished the perpetrators but that the Soviet authorities “made it clear that the 
surviving Jews were subject to the same policies as the rest of the population, no matter how 
traumatic their experience had been.”161 When the Soviets moved into Polish territory, the logic 
was the same.  
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One of the frequent problems cited in studies of Polish memory of the Holocaust is that the 
Soviet period was a time when memory of Nazi crimes against Poland was suppressed. This was 
not entirely true. Holocaust memory – for Jews and Poles – was allowed more room in communist 
Poland than in the Soviet Union itself. Countless studies address Holocaust memory in Poland, but 
hopefully this thesis has provided a new perspective on early events that formed its development. 
It is also the goal that such a perspective can be considered useful not just for Holocaust studies 
but for Soviet and Eastern European history more broadly – because all are ultimately intertwined. 
But it is just one of many perspectives to share. Although larger political goals have been discussed, 
the greatest recurring theme has been the question of negotiating Jewish specificity at Majdanek. 
The Soviet and Polish confrontation with Majdanek was one of ambiguity. On the one hand, the 
war did not significantly change Polish perceptions of Jews – if anything, it exacerbated 
tensions.162 On the other, during the early days of communist rule there was no clear Soviet 
political stance on anything, in general, but especially on the Jewish question.  
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EPILOGUE: APPREHENDING THE LOSS OF LUBLIN’S JEWS 
 
Walking along Lublin’s main street heading towards the old town, if one looks to the left where 
Wieniawska Street crosses with Krakowskie Przedmieście one will see a small orange-yellow 
building that is now home to the law department of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. 
In 1942 it served as the headquarters for Operation Reinhard, the euphemism for Hitler’s Final 
Solution to the Jewish Question. From here, the SS officers in Lublin planned the schedules for 
the departing trains taking the region’s 
Jews to various concentration and death 
camps in Poland. There is nothing to 
indicate to passerby that this building 
ever served such a purpose. Also 
visible from the main street is the 
façade of a tall building next to the 
former Operation Reinhard headquarters on which is written in solemn 
Yiddish verse the words: “Here there once lived a Jewish girl in a house that is no more, on streets 
that are no more.”163  
From the main street, the imagery of these two buildings near eachother highlights the 
ambivalent nature of Jewish memory in Poland today. There is certainly a concentrated effort to 
remember the Jews of Lublin who died in the Holocaust, but a long legacy of pre and post-war 
antisemitism in its various manifestations have complicated that memory effort. In 1939 Lublin 
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had 45,000 Jews. Today there remain 20 Jewish individuals in Lublin.164 As devastating as the 
Holocaust was to Poland’s Jewish population, it is inaccurate to believe that this number reflects 
the effect only of the Holocaust on the Jewish population of Lublin. The loss of Lublin’s Jewish 
population occurred in three stages: the Holocaust (primary), the aftermath of the Kielce Pogrom 
in 1946 (second major decrease), and finally the Anti-Zionist Campaign of 1968 (when the 
remaining Jews left Lublin). The Anti-Zionist-cum-Antisemitic Campaign in Poland provoked 
further Jewish emigration, and the campaign’s legacy remains in Lublin today, although its impact 
was not as severe as it was in Warsaw and other cities. This was because of the cities that had 
sustained a Jewish population after the war, Lublin’s was one of the smallest.  
In 1946, the number of Jews in Lublin was about 2,300.165 This was a mixture of Jews who 
were in camps but had lived in Lublin before the war and those from other cities or even countries 
resurfacing from hiding or returning from the Soviet Union who then settled in Lublin upon the 
liberation of Majdanek. Most of Lublin’s pre-war Jewish population was sent to the death camps 
of Bełżec, Treblinka, and Sobibor and, therefore, did not survive. Yet many surviving Jews from 
the camps liberated in 1944 and 1945 made their way to Lublin. Emil Sommerstein hoped it would 
become a new center for Jewish life due to Warsaw’s destruction and the fact that the region was 
liberated earlier than other areas of Poland. Immediately after the war, there were about 5,000 Jews 
in Lublin, due to Sommerstein’s repatriation efforts. But by 1946 many of those Jews had moved 
to Warsaw and took their new institutions with them.166 Any remaining hopes that Lublin would 
indeed become a new center for Jewish life were destroyed after the infamous Kielce Pogrom of 
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1946. The pogrom caused a mass exodus of Jews from all throughout Poland, and in the same year 
the Jewish population in Lublin decreased by 57% to just about 1,000 Jews.167 Afterwards, the 
Jewish population continued to decrease, and in 1968 there were just 450 Jews in Lublin.168  
By 1968, most Jewish citizens, especially young people, were highly assimilated into 
Polish society and considered themselves first as Polish citizens. Yet Polish society continued its 
legacy of viewing Jews as the ‘other’ and in troublesome times continued to see them as 
scapegoats. NN Theatre (the local Jewish historical memory organization) has for the last ten years 
been interviewing those who emigrated from Lublin in the 1960s. Michał Hochman pointed out 
that scapegoating Jews was nearly ridiculous in Lublin because the Jewish community was so 
small. 169  Even though Poland’s Jewish population was continuously decreasing, Jewish 
institutions were more active and visible than other ethnic minorities’ institutions. In order to 
rebuild their lives after the Holocaust and in response to Sommerstein’s efforts, foreign 
organizations (Jewish and non-Jewish) gave substantially to Jewish institutions in Poland. 
Therefore, Jewish institutions received a large amount of foreign assistance that other ethnic 
groups did not have, which further exacerbated tensions.170 
As Jews began to emigrate from Lublin, they were often required to renounce their Polish 
citizenship. Hochman recalled how he told his colleagues, “See. A week ago, I was a Polish citizen 
and now I’m not.”171 Miriam Kuperman recalled how Jews were issued their travel documents 
with utmost efficiency during a time when party bureaucracy rendered travel abroad for ordinary 
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citizens nearly impossible.172 When she left she knew that she would never return to Lublin, as did 
those Jews who left Lublin at any time after the war.   
In the 1960s when historians began interpreting the Nazi destruction of Jews as genocide 
and referring to it as ‘the Holocaust’, Poles saw the Holocaust as a greater Polish genocide – the 
one context in which Jews counted as Polish citizens.173 At Majdanek Jewish victimhood was 
framed first as universal victimhood among nationalities and then as Polish victimhood when the 
circumstance allowed. Twenty years later, the genocide of Jews was framed as the genocide of 
Poles more broadly. I tried to show in my thesis one perspective on the context for how such 
developments occurred.  
*** 
What remains of Jewish life today in Lublin is only a minuscule fraction of what was once 
one of the largest concentrations of European Jewry. The Holocaust destroyed nearly all of 
Lublin’s original Jews, but a fairly substantial number of Jews lived in the city after the war. The 
Jewish Community in Lublin today is very small, and there are only two institutions that function 
as centers for Jewish religious life, both owned and subsidized by the Jewish community of 
Warsaw. The Chachmei Lublin Yeshiva building at 85 Lubartowska Street survived WWII and 
currently houses a small synagogue, medical academy, and a hotel. There is the small Chevra 
Nosim synagogue with a prayer room on the second floor of a building at 10 Lubartowska Street. 
The remaining Jews celebrate all the Jewish holidays in these places and maintain their traditions. 
Post-war antisemitism and the events of ’68 led not only to further absence of Jewish presence but 
also of the history and memory of what was once a thriving Jewish center. In 2006 the president 
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of the Organization for Lubliners in Israel, Joseph Dakar, was awarded the honorary title of 
Ambassador of Lublin – but behind this is the fact that these Lubliners are in Israel and not in 
Lublin. 
In the early 1990s a theater group moved into a building on Szeroka Street at the Grodzka 
Gate which was the entrance to Lublin’s former Jewish quarter. The theater organization did not 
realize the history of the building they were inhabiting. Neither did the rest of Lublin’s inhabitants. 
When the organization – now called NN Theatre – realized that just outside the gate was a hidden 
Jewish past and buried memory, they transformed the space into a museum and cultural center to 
“uncover the memory of the past while mourning the victims of the Holocaust.” Now the center 
organizes several community artistic and cultural projects that promote the visibility of Jewish 
memory and history of Lublin’s Jewish past, such as marked Jewish heritage trails, evening poetry 
walks following the steps of Lublin’s leading Jewish poet killed in the war, educational workshops, 
and community art displays, as well as maintaining an active media presence.  
Exiting the theatre, an immediate glance to the right reveals a view of Lublin’s former 
Jewish quarter. Now there is a huge parking lot and outdoor concert space on one end and a 
manicured park on the other. What remains of the former district is an eternally burning street 
lamp, indicating what was once a thriving area of Jewish life. 
One of NN Theatre’s most recent projects is a display of enlarged images of glass plate 
frames of photographs taken of several hundred of Lublin’s pre-war Jewish population. These 
frames were found in a box at house number 4 on Rynek Square, close to the Jewish restaurant. 
Together NN Theatre and local authorities planned to enlarge images of the plates and display 
them in various spots around the Old Town. It can be ascertained that most of the Jews in the 
frames died in the Holocaust. This project demonstrates the ambivalent nature of memory in 
80 
 
Lublin. There is nothing to indicate to the public that these people were Jewish, but it provokes 
thought about the mystery of the area and the history it contains. The monuments to the Jewish 
victims of the Holocaust are few in number, small, and easily overlooked, but this project attempts 
to evoke the loss of the Jewish people in a more emotive, albeit nuanced way – simultaneously 
immediate and distant. 
  
Unfortunately, antisemitism remains in Lublin, despite the efforts of organizations to 
overcome it and the great strides Poland has made, in general, in combating its legacy. One should 
not view Polish antisemitism as monolithic, however. There is a need to recognize that Polish 
antisemitism has existed in various forms and degrees in both its pre- and post-war manifestations.  
In 2012 President of Lublin Krzysztof Żuk gave a public speech in which he condemned 
antisemitism saying, “There is no place for antisemitism in Lublin,” speaking to its visibility.174 In 
an example, students from a local school had volunteered to create a unique mural commemorating 
Majdanek, but in 2013 the exhibition was destroyed by an antisemitic vandalist.175 The worst 
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instance of revived antisemitism in Lublin was in January 2014 when a worker at the State Museum 
at Majdanek was arrested for disseminating antisemitic posters around Lublin. The poster 
displayed slurs such as “Syjoniści won z Lublina!” (Zionists leave Lublin!) and “Nasze ulice! 
Nasze kamienice!” (Our streets! Our houses!).176 Another poster displayed a Soviet hammer and 
sickle, Jewish Star of David, and a crude image of homosexuality, all crossed out to indicate 
“forbidden.”  
The Jewish nature of Majdanek has since been recognized in Poland, and the camp grounds 
are well-preserved and remain unchanged except for general maintenance and upkeep. But even 
in Lublin preparations for the commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the liberation of 
Majdanek were overshadowed by those for the 70th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 
– not to be confused with the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943. The Warsaw Uprising which lasted 
from August to October of 1944 represents in the minds of ordinary Poles a symbol for national 
suffering during the war, while Majdanek is increasingly interpreted as uniquely ‘Jewish’.  
Majdanek used to lie two miles outside of Lublin, but now it has essentially become part 
of the cityscape. Although it remains in the suburbs, new houses have been built around the 
perimeter of the camp. After passing Majdanek on foot or by bus one will encounter communist 
era factories, as well as new stores, centers, and parks. There is a pedestrian and bicycle path that 
cuts through the field separating the camp grounds and the memorial monument, and the city’s 
east campus of the Catholic University is directly across the street from the entrance to Majdanek’s 
grounds. This, of course, renders Majdanek visible to the everyday Pole, but one cannot help but 
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notice that it reflects the subsuming of Majdanek into the greater Polish landscape, both literally 
and figuratively.   
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